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COMMENT 
From Stem to Stern: Navigating Bankruptcy 
Practice after Stern v. Marshall  
MICHELLE WRIGHT* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Bankruptcy law has come a long way since its earliest iteration.  No 
longer does it sanction selling debtors into slavery, physically giving creditors 
a pound of flesh of the debtor,1 or treating bankrupt citizens like criminals.2  
While bankruptcy law is more civilized now, it is far from settled or stable.3  
In fact, since its inception in 1800, American bankruptcy law has undergone 
major changes about every forty years.4   
These changes stem from Congress and the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ struggle to balance the Constitution’s demand for impartial 
Article III judges and the efficiency and expertise of specialized Article I 
bankruptcy courts.  Under the United States Constitution, Article III judges 
are granted life tenure and salary protection in order to insure they are fair 
and impartial.5  However, Article I bankruptcy judges do not have these ten-
ure and salary protections.  Instead, they are appointed for fourteen-year 
terms.6  One method of reconciling the need for Article I expertise and Article 
III protections has been through the public rights exception to adjudication by 
Article III courts.  The public rights exception is the idea that there are mat-
ters involving public rights that Congress may assign to legislative courts for 
  
 * B.S. Business Administration, University of Missouri-Columbia, 2013; J.D. 
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2013; Senior Lead Articles Editor, 
Missouri Law Review, 2012-2013.  I am thankful to Professor Michelle Cecil for her 
guidance, advice, and edits.  While the cases in this Article are good law as of this 
Comment’s publication, no additional cases were added after April 2012.  
 1. G. Eric Brunstad, Jr., Bankruptcy and the Problems of Economic Futility: A 
Theory on the Unique Role of Bankruptcy Law, 55 BUS. LAW 499, 513-14 (2000) 
(explaining Roman bankruptcy customs, including allowing creditors to cut off the 
limbs of debtors).  
 2. Id. at 515 (noting that the first bankruptcy law in England categorized a 
debtor as an “offender” and was similar to a criminal statute).  
 3. See infra Part II. 
 4. See infra Part II. 
 5. U.S. Const. art III, § 1. 
 6. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2006). 
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adjudication.7  However, the Supreme Court’s public rights exception juris-
prudence has varied in definition and application.8   
Another method of balancing these concerns grants the bankruptcy court 
“summary jurisdiction,” which is jurisdiction over the property of the estate,9 
while “plenary jurisdiction” over individual parties is reserved for Article III 
courts.10  Further, by continually changing the bankruptcy statutes, Congress 
has experimented with making the bankruptcy courts “adjuncts” of the district 
courts, so they are under the control of Article III judges.11  Finally, Congress 
tried to solve the problem of Article I courts deciding Article III cases by 
defining claims as “core” or “non-core” to limit bankruptcy authority.12  Core 
claims are matters stemming directly from the bankruptcy case or Title 11, 
the part of the United States Code that governs bankruptcy.13   
Understanding this turbulent history of bankruptcy law is essential to 
understanding the future of the bankruptcy system.  The Supreme Court of 
the United States’ latest word on bankruptcy courts’ authority, Stern v. Mar-
shall, discusses the public rights exception, the summary-plenary divide, and 
bankruptcy courts as adjuncts of Article III courts.14  The case ultimately 
finds Congress’ definition of “core” bankruptcy matters unconstitutional.15   
In order to provide a foundation for understanding the Court’s reasoning 
in Stern, Part II of this Comment briefly covers the history of bankruptcy in 
America.  Section III explains how the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
holding in Stern v. Marshall16 has affected bankruptcy courts’ disposition of 
state law claims.  Scholars’ interpretations of Stern range from understanding 
it as a narrow holding that will change little in bankruptcy,17 to questioning 
whether it foreshadows the Court holding the entire bankruptcy system is 
  
 7. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2610 (2011).  
 8. See infra Part II.G-H.  
 9. Ralph Brubaker, Nondebtor Releases and Injunctions in Chapter 11: Revisit-
ing Jurisdictional Precepts and the Forgotten Callaway v. Benton Case, 72 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 1, 23 (1998) [hereinafter Brubaker, Nondebtor Releases]. 
 10. Id. at 23-24. 
 11. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 
(1982) (declaring the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 unconstitutional and describing 
bankruptcy courts as “a non-Art. III adjunct”); see also infra Part II.G. 
 12. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601-02, 2620.  
 13. Id. at 2605.  
 14. See generally id. 
 15. Id. at 2601. 
 16. Id. (holding that the Bankruptcy Court had the statutory authority, but lacked 
the constitutional authority, to rule on state law counterclaims).  
 17. See, e.g., Dan Schechter, Statutory Power of Bankruptcy Courts to Hear and 
Determine Compulsory State-Law Counterclaims Against Non-Bankrupt Claimants Is 
Unconstitutional, 2011 COM. FIN. NEWSL. 51, 51 (2011).  
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unconstitutional in a future case.18  Given the breadth of opinions that the 
decision supports, it is predictable that Stern has been interpreted differently 
by district and bankruptcy courts across the country.  In order to aid practitio-
ners, Part IV explains how bankruptcy courts are determining whether mat-
ters are core or non-core, when courts are finding consent, how courts are 
resolving state law claims, and rationalizing these decisions in light of Stern, 
and the historical background of bankruptcy law.  Finally, in furtherance of 
the goal of helping practitioners navigate post-Stern waters, Part V concludes 
this Comment by summarizing jurisdictional splits between courts on these 
critical issues and the relevant historical arguments. 
II.  HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
To fully understand the current bankruptcy system and the Court’s rea-
soning in Stern, a practitioner must first understand the history of the bank-
ruptcy system and how it has changed over the centuries.  This Comment 
starts at the beginning of American bankruptcy history, and documents the 
major statutory changes to bankruptcy law and corresponding Supreme Court 
cases.  
A.  Origins of American Bankruptcy Law 
A brief introduction to the English system of bankruptcy is important 
because American bankruptcy courts developed from the English system,19 
and English history explains why the American founders created protections 
for Article III judges.  Understanding the reasoning behind Article III protec-
tions illuminates the problems with adjudication by legislative Article I bank-
ruptcy courts that lack these protections.  
In the English bankruptcy system, commissioners could make judg-
ments about creditors’ claims, but they only had jurisdiction over the property 
in the debtor’s estate, not property in the hands of third parties.20  Therefore, 
the only way the trustee could make claims on property in the hands of third 
parties was to make a formal complaint in a court of law or equity.21  Jurisdic-
  
 18. Adam Lewis et al., Stern v. Marshall: A Jurisdictional Game Changer?, J. 
BANKR.  L. 483, 492 (2011).  
 19. Ralph Brubaker, Article III’s Bleak House (Part I):  The Statutory Limits of 
Bankruptcy Judges’ Core Jurisdiction, BANKR. L. LETTER, Aug. 2011, at 5.  English 
bankruptcy law can be traced back to a 1542 statute allowing government officials to 
seize and sell off assets of some types of debtors, labeled as “offenders” in the act.  
Brunstad, supra note 1, at 515.  Offenders could be sentenced to punishments as se-
vere as death. Id.  While the English system of bankruptcy started with a criminal 
statute, it evolved into a more complex property-based system, and was eventually 
administered by bankruptcy commissioners.  Brubaker, supra, at 5. 
 20. Brubaker, supra note 19, at 5. 
 21. Id. 
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tion over property is the basis of “summary jurisdiction” and was adopted by 
the original American bankruptcy courts.22  Further, these English bankruptcy 
commissioners were supervised by the Lord Chancellor in Equity, who could 
be petitioned for review of the commissioners’ determinations, similar to how 
modern district courts may be petitioned to review bankruptcy court determi-
nations.23  
The current controversy regarding the independence of judges also has 
roots in the English bankruptcy system.  The injustices of the English kings 
who “made [j]udges dependent on [the king’s] [w]ill alone, for the tenure of 
their offices, and [in] the amount and payment of their salaries,”24 led to the 
framers’ creation of position and salary protections for judges in Article III of 
the Constitution in order to maintain an independent judiciary.25  Bankruptcy 
judges do not enjoy these protections because they are not part of the Article 
III judiciary.26  
B.  The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 
After the Constitution federalized the bankruptcy system, Congress 
passed the first national bankruptcy law.27  The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 (Act 
of 1800) was spurred by the economic panic of 1797, which increased the 
number of debtors in America.28  While the Act of 1800 incorporated some 
facets of the English bankruptcy system, there were differences.  
The Act of 1800 was similar to the English system because the Act of 
1800 allowed court officials to seize assets of a debtor and decide claims of 
creditors.29  Further, while later changes to the American Bankruptcy Code 
abolished strict summary jurisdiction for bankruptcy courts, the bankruptcy 
courts established in 1800 were based on summary jurisdiction like their Eng-
lish predecessors.30  “Summary jurisdiction” is jurisdiction over the property 
of the estate,31 while “plenary jurisdiction” is jurisdiction over individual 
parties.32  The Act of 1800 also allowed for parties to petition for review of 
  
 22. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 
(1982). 
 23. Brubaker, supra note 19, at 5. 
 24. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011) (quoting THE DECLARATION 
OF INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776)).  
 25. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 26. Brubaker, supra note 19, at 8. 
 27. Brunstad, supra note 1, at 516; see also Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 
19 (repealed 1803).   
 28. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United 
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 14 (1995).  
 29. Brunstad, supra note 1, at 516-17. 
 30. See id. at 516. 
 31. Brubaker, Nondebtor Releases, supra note 9, at 23. 
 32. Id. 
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the commissioners’ decisions by federal district courts.33  The authority of 
federal district review is still alive and well today.34 
However, Americans were already starting to diverge from the English 
system; fraudulent bankruptcy was no longer punishable by death,35 and the 
Act of 1800 exempted certain property from creditors and discharged some 
debts.36  While revolutionary, the Act of 1800 was repealed in only three 
years; creditors objected that wealthy speculators were getting discharged too 
often, leaving creditors with no repayment, and agriculturists complained that 
merchants were favored as creditors.37  And so began the shifting landscape 
of bankruptcy in America.  
C.  The Bankruptcy Act of 1841 
After a period of time without a federal bankruptcy system, Congress 
again realized the importance of debtor relief and passed a new act. 38  The 
Bankruptcy Act of 1841 (Act of 1841) allowed voluntary bankruptcy for the 
first time, a change that has withstood the test of time.39  Also, bankruptcy 
assignees replaced commissioners in adjudicating bankruptcy claims.40  
However, these bankruptcy assignees were not given Article III judicial pro-
tections; this problem remains the crux of bankruptcy courts’ jurisdictional 
problems today.   
The Act of 1841 also marks a period of waxing bankruptcy power.  Jus-
tice Story broadly interpreted the Act of 1841 and stated that Congress had 
the power to enact broad authority to give bankruptcy courts enough jurisdic-
tion to “begin, continue, and end, all such proceedings as might be necessary 
and proper . . . to accomplish the entire settlement and final distribution of the 
bankrupt’s estate.”41  Further, Justice Story declared bankruptcy jurisdiction 
exclusively federal and found in equity.42  By granting bankruptcy law exclu-
sive federal jurisdiction, Justice Story hoped to produce uniform bankruptcy 
laws.43 
  
 33. Brubaker, supra note 19, at 6.  
 34. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a) (2006). 
 35. Tabb, supra note 28, at 14.  
 36. Brunstad, supra note 1, at 517.  
 37. Tabb, supra note 28, at 15; see also Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248 
(1803).  
 38. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (1841).  
 39. Tabb, supra note 28, at 17.  
 40. Id.  
 41. Mitchell v. Great Works Milling & Mfg. Co., 17 F. Cas. 496, 499 (C.C.D. 
Me. 1843). 
 42. Id. at 500-01. 
 43. Id. at 500.  
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This broader definition of bankruptcy jurisdiction continued in the Su-
preme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Christy,44 where Justice Story interpreted 
the Act of 1841 as giving district courts jurisdiction over “all matters and 
proceedings in bankruptcy,” including a list of enumerated cases where juris-
diction would be found, and jurisdiction in all cases and controversies in 
bankruptcy arising between creditors and the estate.45  This decision extended 
bankruptcy jurisdiction to allow procedures to recover assets for the estate 
instead of just having jurisdiction over the assets already in the estate.  This 
extension is now a part of our modern bankruptcy system.46  
Justice Story’s interpretations of the Act of 1841 broadened the jurisdic-
tion of bankruptcy courts and clarified the district court’s jurisdiction over 
bankruptcy matters.  Even today, district courts have jurisdiction over all 
bankruptcy matters,47 and parties can appeal bankruptcy courts’ decisions to a 
federal district court.48  In the end, however, the Act of 1841 still had too 
many problems to survive for long, including lax standards for discharges that 
caused many creditors to forego repayment and exemptions that resulted in 
low dividends for creditors.49  The Act was repealed in 1843.50 
D.  The Bankruptcy Act of 1867 
The nation existed without a federal bankruptcy statute until the Panic of 
1857 and the economic effects of the Civil War convinced Congress to try 
again.51  The Bankruptcy Act of 186752 (Act of 1867) had language similar to 
the Act of 184153 and also allowed for voluntary bankruptcy.54  More aspects 
of our current bankruptcy system began to appear in the Act of 1867, includ-
ing language that (1) allowed corporations to file for bankruptcy, (2) permit-
  
 44. 44 U.S. 292 (1845).  Ex Parte Christy is a case concerning two mortgages on 
the land of Mr. Daniel Walden assigned to William Christy in bankruptcy.  Id. at 293.  
The bank initially foreclosed on the mortgages and seized the property.  Id.  A month 
later Walden filed a petition for bankruptcy, asked for an injunction to stay the sale of 
the property.  Id.  The district court denied the injunction and the property was sold.  
Id. at 294.  Christy filed a petition claiming that the sale was void because the bank-
ruptcy proceeding operated as a stay.  Id.  
 45. Id. at 313.  
 46. Brubaker, supra note 19, at 6.  
 47. 28 U.S.C. § 1334 (2006). 
 48. 28 U.S.C. § 158(a). 
 49. Tabb, supra note 28, at 18.  
 50. Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614 (1843). 
 51. W. HOMER DRAKE, ET. AL., Prologue: A Brief History of the Development of 
Modern Bankruptcy Law, in CHAPTER 13 PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1:1 (2012).  
 52. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517 (1867). 
 53. Ralph Brubaker, On the Nature of Federal Bankruptcy Jurisdiction:  A Gen-
eral Statutory and Constitutional Theory, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 763 (2000). 
 54. § 11, 14 Stat. at 521-22.  
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ted any person, not just merchants, to be subject to involuntary bankruptcy, 
and (3) permitted district courts to appoint “registers” to assist them with 
bankruptcy matters.55  The registers replaced the bankruptcy commissioners 
and were able to adjudicate bankruptcy claims.56  However, like their prede-
cessors and eventual successors, bankruptcy registers were not Article III 
judges.  
The Act of 1867 attempted to resolve a major complaint of the Act of 
1841 by narrowing discharge relief.57  However, the Act of 1867 negated 
some of its own solution by allowing debtors to choose between federal, or 
possibly more generous, state exemptions.58  Again, complaints that the bank-
ruptcy process was too expensive, the estate was eaten by administration 
fees,59 the creditors were receiving small dividends, and the delays were un-
reasonable led to the failure of the Act.60  The next bankruptcy act to be 
passed, and fail shortly thereafter, was the Bankruptcy Act of 1874.61  
E.  The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
In 1898, Congress finally passed a bankruptcy statute that lasted more 
than a few years.62 The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Act of 1898) borrowed 
some provisions from past bankruptcy acts, such as allowing voluntary bank-
ruptcy and involuntary bankruptcy against corporations; however, the Act of 
1898 had other substantive and procedural changes that moved bankruptcy 
law into the twentieth century.63  
The Act of 1898 was the first bankruptcy statute to abolish the need for 
creditor approval for discharges64 and also protected debtors by setting up 
safeguards against malicious, involuntary bankruptcy petitions.65  One of 
these safeguards was the right to a jury trial to determine the validity of a 
  
 55. Tabb, supra note 28, at 19.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Id. at 19-20.  
 58. Id. at 20.  
 59. David A. Skeel, Jr., The Genius of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. 
J. 321, 332 (1999). 
 60. Tabb, supra note 28, at 19.  
 61. The Bankruptcy Act of 1874 was a small step toward our current bankruptcy 
system in that it had a tool that prior Acts did not have; this Act gave debtors the 
power to propose payment plans to discharge debts.  Id. at 21.  The debtor could also 
retain the property while making these payments.  Id.  However, despite this large 
change, the Act of 1874 soon failed and was repealed in 1878.  Id. 
 62. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898); Tabb, supra note 28, at 23.  
 63. Tabb, supra note 28, at 23-26. 
 64. Id. at 24.  
 65. Skeel, supra note 59, at 335.  
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petition for involuntary bankruptcy.66  The 1898 Act also gave state courts 
sole jurisdiction over bringing preference and fraudulent conveyance 
claims.67  The latter is important to note as it begins the complex history of 
preferences and fraudulent conveyances that is later referenced in Stern and is 
currently confusing bankruptcy court litigants.68 
The Act of 1898 allowed appointment of “referees” to conduct bank-
ruptcy cases, but the district court could always withdraw the case from the 
referee69 or later review the case.70  This power of withdrawal and review by 
the district court codified Justice Story’s determination that the district court 
had jurisdiction over all bankruptcy matters.71  The referee had summary 
jurisdiction,72 which allowed him to hear claims over property in the estate, 
and, if the parties consented, disputes about property held by third parties.73  
Other bankruptcy-related matters were tried in a state or federal district 
court.74  
Also, Congress gave more thought to the process and procedure of bank-
ruptcy when it gave the Supreme Court the power to proscribe procedural 
rules governing bankruptcy cases.75 Preferential and fraudulent transfer 
claims again made an appearance as the trustees – the replacement for assign-
ees – gained more jurisdiction and power to avoid the claims.76  The hope of 
the Court was that referees and trustees would be able to oversee the process 
better and reduce the high administrative fees that had plagued the Act of 
1867.77  This reasoning, and the continued expansion of bankruptcy courts’ 
authority, represents the Court’s acknowledgment of the efficiency of special-
ized legislative courts.  However, while the Act of 1898 became the founda-
  
 66. Janine C. Ciallella, Should Bankruptcy Judges Be Permitted to Conduct Jury 
Trials?, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 175, 178-79 (2000).  The right to jury trials in 
Article I bankruptcy courts was later questioned by the Supreme Court.  Granfinan-
cier, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).   
 67. Skeel, supra note 59, at 334-35.  
 68. See infra Part IV. 
 69. See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 
(1982). 
 70. Id. 
 71. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
 72. Susan Block-Lieb, The Costs of a Non-Article III Bankruptcy Court System, 
72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 529, 531 (1998). 
 73. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 53. 
 74. Block-Lieb, supra note 72, at 532.  
 75. Tabb, supra note 28, at 25.  
 76. Id. at 26.  
 77. Skeel, supra note 59, at 334; see also Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 
(1966) (looking at legislative history to find that the intent of the Act of 1898 was to 
make bankruptcy laws less expensive to administer).  
8
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tion of American bankruptcy law for eighty years, it was amended and 
changed several times.78  
F.  The Chandler Amendments of 1938 
The Chandler Amendments of 1938 did not repeal the Act of 1898, but 
amended it to add more options.79  These options included commercial reor-
ganization, composition relief for agricultural debtors, railroad reorganiza-
tion, municipal debt adjustment, and a wage earner reorganization provi-
sion.80   
As the options began to broaden, so too did the interpretation of the 
bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction over matters traditionally thought reserved for 
plenary jurisdiction.  In Katchen v. Landy, the Supreme Court allowed a 
bankruptcy court to decide a claim that would have otherwise been entitled to 
a jury trial.81  The Court held that this conversion of a legal claim into an 
equitable claim was necessary to prohibit the delay and expense of splitting 
the action into a bankruptcy claim and a jury trial.82  
G.  The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
Congress overhauled the bankruptcy laws again in 1978.  The Bank-
ruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (Reform Act of 1978) kept some of the reorgani-
zation procedures of the Chandler Amendments, but added many new 
changes.83  One of the most important changes was the creation of bankruptcy 
courts separate from district courts.84   
The Reform Act of 1978 created a bankruptcy court for each federal dis-
trict and gave the new bankruptcy court “all of the jurisdiction conferred by 
this section on the district courts.”85  Replacing the referee system, modern 
  
 78. Tabb, supra note 28, at 27.  
 79. Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (repealed 1979); Brunstad, 
supra note 1, at 517.  
 80. Id. at 517-18.  
 81. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 336.  The Court later interpreted its decision as reason-
ing that requiring two different suits to recover on a counterclaim would be a “mean-
ingless gesture.”  Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852 
(1986) (citing Katchen, 382 U.S. at 334).  
 82. Katchen, 382 U.S. at 339.  
 83. Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549; Brubaker, supra note 
19, at 7-8. 
 84. Brubaker, supra note 19, at 8.  
 85. Id. (quoting § 241, 92 Stat. at 2668). 
9
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bankruptcy judges presided over these new courts,86 which had exclusive 
jurisdiction over all cases arising under Title 11.87  
The Reform Act of 1978 was also the first legislation from Congress 
eliminating the distinction between summary and plenary jurisdiction and 
allowing bankruptcy judges more procedural options, such as jury trials, de-
claratory judgments, and writs of habeas corpus.88  Currently some commen-
tators think that this abolishment of the summary/plenary distinction may 
have been reversed by Stern.89 
These changes put the registers, turned referees, turned bankruptcy 
judges, on similar footing with Article III judges,90 but without the protec-
tions afforded to Article III judges.91  Bankruptcy judges are appointed by the 
president for fourteen-year terms, can be removed,92 and their salaries can be 
adjusted.93  Article III judges are appointed by the president,94 hold their of-
fice for life (except for misconduct), and their salaries cannot be changed.95   
Yet, the Reform Act of 1978 did not last long.96  In Northern Pipeline 
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,97 the Supreme Court declared 
section 1471 of the Reform Act of 1978 unconstitutional.98  The plurality 
opinion found that Congress had granted too much authority to non-Article 
III bankruptcy judges.99  Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens, considered the three exceptions under which Con-
gress may create legislative courts: territorial courts, military tribunals, and 
  
 86. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 53 (1982). 
 87. 28 U.S.C. § 1471 (Supp. III 1979), invalidated by Marathon, 458 U.S. 50; 
Block-Lieb, supra note 72, at 532.  
 88. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 54, 85. 
 89. See, e.g., George W. Kuney, Stern v. Marshall: A Likely Return to the Bank-
ruptcy Act’s Summary/Plenary Distinction in Article III Terms, 21 NORTON J. BANKR. 
L. & PRAC. 1, 13 (2011). 
 90. Ciallella, supra note 66, at 180. 
 91. Brubaker, supra note 19, at 8.  
 92. Bankruptcy judges could be removed by the “judicial council of the circuit” 
for “incompetency, misconduct, neglect of duty or physical or mental disability.”  
Marathon, 458 U.S. at 53 (quoting Act of Nov. 6, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 153(b), 
92 Stat. 2549) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 93. Brubaker, supra note 19, at 8.   
 94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 95. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 96. Brubaker, supra note 19, at 8 (noting that the “jurisdictional design” of the 
Reform Act was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1982).  
 97. 458 U.S. 50.  Marathon was a case about a debtor in possession to recover 
damages from a third party for a breach of contract.  Brubaker, supra note 19, at 8.  
Under the 1898 Act, the suit would have to be brought in a state or federal district 
court, and not under a referee, but under the 1978 Act a bankruptcy judge could de-
cide the claim.  Id.  
 98. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87.  
 99. Id.  
10
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courts deciding public rights.100  The plurality’s focus was on the last excep-
tion, the one for public rights,101 which the Court admitted did not previously 
have a clear definition.102  This so-called “public rights exception” would 
make appearances in later Supreme Court cases regarding bankruptcy and 
eventually in Stern v. Marshall.103 
However, in Marathon, the plurality defined a public right as one that 
“must at a minimum arise ‘between the government and others[,]’”104 and 
decided that this bankruptcy claim did not fit the exception.105  Further, Jus-
tice Brennan decided that the bankruptcy courts were not permissible adjuncts 
of the district courts,106 and Congress could neither establish Article III courts 
under the bankruptcy clause nor allow Article I courts to decide Article III 
matters.107  The lack of a valid exception, and the fact that under no previous 
act had a bankruptcy judge been able to adjudicate a final judgment in a state 
law claim,108 led the plurality to declare that the bankruptcy laws gave too 
much power to Article I judges.109  The Supreme Court thus declared that the 
Reform Act of 1978 was unconstitutional and began a debate about how to 
structure bankruptcy courts to stay true to the constitutional reservation of 
judicial power to Article III judges that continues today.110  
The dissenting judges in Marathon argued that a balancing test should 
be used to weigh the constitutional policy reasons for Article III courts 
against the congressional authority to create Article I courts.111  The dissent 
argued that bankruptcy matters are usually not politically charged, that there 
is a right of appeal to Article III courts, that bankruptcy courts significantly 
  
 100. Id. at 64-67.  
 101. Id. at 67 (citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land  & Improvement Co., 59 
U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1855)).  
 102. Id. at 69.  
 103. See infra Parts II.H, III.B. 
 104. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 69 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 
451 (1929)).  The Marathon Court’s explanation of the three exceptions and when 
Congress may create Article I courts was, and still is, criticized for its absence of 
clarity.  See Brubaker, supra note 19, at 9.  
 105. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 71.  However, the Court did leave the door open that 
some bankruptcy proceedings may be public rights.  Id.  
 106. Id. at 87.  
 107. 9 AM. JUR. 2d Bankruptcy § 829 (2011).  
 108. Brubaker, supra note 19, at 8.  
 109. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 87.  
 110. Id.  The Court felt it was very important for cases to have Article III protec-
tion because, “[i]n sum, our Constitution unambiguously enunciates a fundamental 
principle – that the ‘judicial Power of the United States’ must be reposed in an inde-
pendent Judiciary.  It commands that the independence of the Judiciary be jealously 
guarded, and it provides clear institutional protections for that independence.” Id. at 
60.  
 111. Id. at 113 (White, J., dissenting).  Justice White’s dissenting opinion was 
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell.  Id. at 92. 
11
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lower the stress on Article III courts and expedite matters, and that turning 
bankruptcy judges into Article III judges would have disadvantages for the 
flexibility of the system.112  The dissent further argued that the Reform Act of 
1978 passed this balancing test and should be upheld.113  This efficiency and 
practicality argument would later be used in Stern v. Marshall and would 
again win votes only from a minority of the Court.114  
H.  Bankruptcy Reform Act Amendments of 1984 
After the Reform Act of 1978, Congress passed the Reform Act 
Amendments of 1984 (Reform Act Amendments).  These amendments were 
tested by substantial amounts of litigation that further shaped the future of 
bankruptcy law.  This Part will briefly explain the Act itself and the subse-
quent litigation.  
1.  Reform Act Amendments 
Congress failed to draft a new bankruptcy law during the Supreme 
Court’s six month stay of the Marathon decision.115  Instead, Congress took 
two years to pass new laws designed to make the bankruptcy system constitu-
tional.116  In the intervening time, an emergency measure was passed by the 
Judicial Conference to allow district courts to refer Title 11 cases to bank-
ruptcy judges, but some district courts considered this an invalid measure 
under Marathon and did not follow it.117   
While the lower courts were struggling with how to proceed without a 
valid bankruptcy act, Congress debated making the bankruptcy courts Article 
III courts,118 but ultimately tried to fix the unconstitutionality of the bank-
ruptcy system by emphasizing that district courts had jurisdiction over bank-
ruptcy cases and that district courts could refer these matters to bankruptcy 
judges.119  Congress also emphasized that district courts could not refer mat-
ters involving “non-core” or “related to” bankruptcy matters to bankruptcy 
  
 112. 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 
3528 (3d ed.). 
 113. Marathon, 458 U.S. at 118.  
 114. Stern v. Marshall, 131 U.S. 2594, 2639 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 115. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 112, § 3528.  
 116. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeships Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 
98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.); Patrick Scott & 
Gary Robinson, Supreme Court Addresses Limits on Bankruptcy Judges’ Powers, 
WESTLAW J. ASBESTOS, Aug. 5, 2011, at *2. 
 117. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 112, § 3528.  
 118. Block-Lieb, supra note 72, at 529. 
 119. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a), (d) (2006), invalidated by Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 
2594 (2011); Scott & Robinson, supra note 116, at 2.  
12
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judges120 unless the litigant consented to the jurisdiction121 or the finding was 
non-final and the district court reviewed the determination de novo.122  The 
Reform Act Amendments of 1984 enumerated what Congress considered 
“core” matters.123  Core matters were essential to the bankruptcy process and 
were properly referred to bankruptcy judges.  Determining whether Congress 
correctly defined core matters is central to today’s debate and an understand-
ing of current bankruptcy court decisions.  
2.  Judicial Interpretation of the Reform Act Amendments 
Cases decided shortly after the Reform Act Amendments limited the 
holding in Marathon124 and were more flexible about giving authority to Ar-
ticle I courts.125  This time period represented another waxing cycle of bank-
ruptcy authority with Supreme Court of the United States cases giving more 
guidance to lower bankruptcy courts that were confused about their authority 
and what constituted core claims.126  For example, Thomas v. Union Carbide 
  
 120. Scott & Robinson, supra note 116, at 2.  
 121. Block-Lieb, supra note 72, at 536 (noting that some courts required consent 
expressly laid out in the pleadings, and some courts found that consent could be im-
plied from the parties’ conduct). 
 122. Scott & Robinson, supra note 116, at 2; see also Benjamin Rosenblum & 
Scott J. Friedman, Stern v. Marshall – Shaking Bankruptcy Jurisdiction to Its Core?, 
BUS. RESTRUCTURING REV., July/Aug. 2011, at 6, 7.  
 123. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (2006).  Core matters included matters of administra-
tion, exercising a trustee or debtor’s avoidance powers, disputes as to the validity or 
priority of liens, disputes about the use, sale, or lease of property, among others.  1 
WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, § 4:68 (3d ed.).  
Further, there are “catch-all” provisions making “every matter concerning the admini-
stration of the estate” or “affecting the liquidation of assets of the estate” core pro-
ceedings.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 124. See, e.g., Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 
(1985) (“The Court’s most recent pronouncement on the meaning of Article III is 
Northern Pipeline.  A divided Court was unable to agree on the precise scope and 
nature of Article III’s limitations.  The Court’s holding in that case establishes only 
that Congress may not vest in a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render 
final judgment, and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under 
state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary appellate re-
view.”). 
 125. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 840-41 
(1986); Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584. 
 126. See In re Castlerock Props., 781 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1986) (declining to fi-
nally adjudicate a claim for fear of Article III problems); In re Nanodata Computer 
Corp., 52 B.R. 334, 340-41 (Bankr. W.D. N.Y. 1985) (finding core proceeding 
broadly as any claim arising under Title 11 or in a case which arose under Title 11), 
aff’d, 74 B.R. 766 (W.D. N.Y. 1987); In re Murchison, 54 B.R. 721, 725 (Bankr. 
N.D. Tex. 1985) (holding that a claim must meet the requirements of core status and 
the § 157(b)(1) nexus requirements).  
13
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Agricultural Products Co.127 considered arbitration of environmental claims 
by an Article I court.128  The Union Carbide Court seemed to move toward 
adopting the dissent’s view in Marathon – that a balancing test should be 
used to decide the constitutionality of Article I adjudication.129  The majority 
in Union Carbide weighed the policy purposes of Article I courts with the 
need for the protections of the Article III courts and also considered the ex-
tent of the encroachment of separation of the branches of government.130  
In Union Carbide, the Court also changed its definition of a public right.  
It abandoned the “bright line test” that came with the “public rights/private 
rights dichotomy” approach to finding authorization for Article I courts and 
instead paid attention to “substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on formal 
categories.”131  The Union Carbide Court found that the balancing test 
weighed in favor of constitutionality.132 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor133 was not specifi-
cally about bankruptcy courts but is important to bankruptcy history because 
it followed Union Carbide’s approach of balancing an impartial Article III 
judge with the expertise of having a specialized Article I court.134  In Schor, 
the Court found that Congress clearly intended the Commodity Futures Trad-
ing Commission (CFTC) to adjudicate counterclaims, and that this adjudica-
tion by the Commission was necessary for the purposes of the program, 
which were to reduce the expense and inefficiency of litigating the same is-
sues in two forums.135  The majority noted that the constitutionality of the 
non-Article III decision “must be assessed by reference to the purposes un-
derlying the requirements of Article III,”136 and cited Union Carbide for the 
proposition that attention should be paid to “substance rather than doctrinaire 
  
 127. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).  
 128. Id. at 571.  Thomas involved an arbitration scheme set up under the Federal 
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act which required submission of certain data 
to the Environmental Protection Agency, which could be then used by other manufac-
turers if the later manufacturer agreed to pay the manufacturer that originally submit-
ted the data.  Id. at 571-75.  If the second manufacturer did not pay for the shared data 
then the parties would be forced into binding arbitration with very limited Article III 
review.  Id. at 573-75. 
 129. Id. at 583; see supra note 111 and accompanying text.  
 130. Block-Lieb, supra note 72, at 539. 
 131. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 585-87.  
 132. Id. at 593-94.  
 133. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).  Schor concerned the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC) which could hear state law counterclaims in connection with the 
Commodity Exchange Act (CEA).  Id. at 836-37.  Congress’ purpose in allowing this 
was to make the procedure “inexpensive and expeditious.”  Id. at 837.  After a pro-
ceeding by the CFTC in which Schor sued and Conti succeeded in its counterclaim, 
Schor challenged the authority of the CFTC to decide the counterclaim.  Id. at 838.  
 134. Block-Lieb, supra note 72, at 538-39.  
 135. Schor, 478 U.S. at 841-44.  
 136. Id. at 847. 
14
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reliance on formal categories.”137  The Schor Court found that if the parties 
consented, then the CFTC acted constitutionally because the right of an Arti-
cle III court can be waived.138  The majority found that while there was no 
evidence of express waiver, Schor impliedly waived the right when he filed 
his claim with the CFTC reparations commission.139  This concept of consent 
to Article I adjudication is still debated today by bankruptcy courts trying to 
gain authority to issue final judgments in non-core matters.140   
Further, when considering whether the Article I court could hear and ad-
judicate the case, the Supreme Court in Schor considered other factors, in-
cluding whether the claim is one normally vested only in Article III courts, 
the importance of the right, and the reason why Congress chose to give the 
adjudication to a non-Article III body.141  The Court noted the cost savings, 
expedited proceedings, and ability for decisions to be made by those with 
specific expertise in the subject as factors in favor of Article I court adjudica-
tion.142  Therefore, the Schor Court held that the CFTC’s adjudication was a 
valid exercise of Congressional authority.143  The Court warned about adopt-
ing “formalistic and unbending rules” about Article III because they would 
“unduly constrict Congress’ ability” to take action.144  This statement repre-
sented an acknowledgement that the efficiency and expertise of Article I 
bankruptcy courts could support their existence despite concerns about bank-
ruptcy courts’ constitutional Article III deficiencies.  
However, while the Supreme Court took a more liberal view of Article I 
authority immediately after the Reform Act Amendments, it did not entirely 
cease questioning the legitimacy of the bankruptcy system.145  In Grandfi-
nanciera v. Nordberg, the Supreme Court decided that, while Congress had 
decided fraudulent conveyance actions to be “core” proceedings, the Seventh 
Amendment still applied to such claims.146  The Court held that to decide 
whether a jury trial was available, a court needed to look at old English ac-
tions and determine if the claim was one of law or equity, with the former 
having the right of a jury.147  The Grandfinanciera Court found that under 
  
 137. Id. at 848 (quoting Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587).  
 138. See id. 
 139. Id. at 849.  
 140. See infra Part IV.B. 
 141. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851. 
 142. Id. at 855-56.  
 143. Id. at 841; Block-Lieb, supra note 72, at 538.  
 144. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.  
 145. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).  Granfinanciera in-
volved a claim under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code for a fraudulent conveyance 
where a trial by jury was requested and denied by the bankruptcy judge because the 
bankruptcy judge understood core issues to be non-jury issues.  Id. at 36-37.  
 146. Id. at 36 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H) (1982)). 
 147. Id. at 42.   
15
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English law, fraudulent transfer claims were suits at law and were heard be-
fore juries.148 
Further, the Court noted that prior to the Reform Act of 1978, fraudulent 
conveyance claims were not decided by a bankruptcy trustee but were de-
cided as a separate jury trial in a state or federal court.149  This separate adju-
dication was the same type of traditional summary versus plenary reasoning 
that the Court relied on in Marathon.150  The Grandfinanciera Court then 
emphasized the narrowness of its holding,151 and decided that Article I courts 
could not hold jury trials absent consent of the parties.152  
In so holding, the Grandfinanciera Court noted that its definition of a 
public right had (again) changed from Marathon,153 and stated that a public 
right need not involve the government, but in order to have a public right, the 
government needs to have created a private right closely integrated with a 
public scheme.154  Despite the new definition, the Grandfinanciera Court was 
still dubious of the claim that bankruptcy was a public right155 and expressly 
stated in a footnote that it was not holding that restructuring of debtor-creditor 
relations was in fact a public right.156  
However, in the later case of Langenkamp v. Culp,157 the Supreme Court 
held that creditors who submitted claims against the bankruptcy estate had no 
Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial when the bankruptcy trustee counter-
claimed for preferential transfers.158  Therefore, the Court noted a difference 
in whether the creditor is the first to file a claim against the estate or not; if 
the creditor files first and then the trustee files a preferential action, then the 
  
 148. Id. at 43.  
 149. Id. at 49-50.  
 150. See Brubaker, supra note 19, at 8.  
 151. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 50 (specifying that it was not deciding if a bank-
ruptcy court could conduct jury trials in a fraudulent conveyance suit against a person 
who did not consent by entering a claim against the estate, if Congress had the consti-
tutional authority to allow Article I bankruptcy judges to preside over jury trials sub-
ject to review or withdrawal by the district court, or if the district court’s ability to set 
aside factual findings of a bankruptcy court was constitutional as applied to jury find-
ings). 
 152. Id.  
 153. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67 (1982) 
(citing Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 
272 (1855)). 
 154. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 54 (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. 
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586 (1985)).  
 155. Id. at 55-56.  
 156. Id. at 56 n.11.  This footnote is currently causing bankruptcy courts to doubt 
whether fraudulent transfers claims, the claim involved in Grandfinanciera, are 
within bankruptcy court’s authority to enter a final judgment in.  
 157. 498 U.S. 42 (1990).  
 158. Id. at 44-45. 
16
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preferential action becomes “integral to the restructuring of the debtor-
creditor relationship through the bankruptcy court’s equity jurisdiction.”159   
Further, dissenting justices in subsequent Supreme Court cases still 
questioned the authority of bankruptcy courts to enter orders like injunctions 
in non-core proceedings.160  According to a special report by the National 
Bankruptcy Review Commission,161 doubt that bankruptcy courts fell within 
the public rights exception expressed in Granfinanceria by the majority, and 
opinions to the same effect expressed by dissenters in later Supreme Court 
opinions, caused lengthy litigation over whether bankruptcy courts had the 
authority to enter binding judgments.162  Engaging in some foreshadowing of 
the issue in Stern, the Bankruptcy Commission noted that Granfinanceria’s 
holding could mean that not all congressionally designated “core” proceed-
ings actually fell under the jurisdiction of the Article I bankruptcy court.163  
Despite this doubt expressed by the Supreme Court and the Bankruptcy 
Commission, several courts of appeal ruled that the Reform Act Amendments 
were constitutional.164  
III.  THIRTY YEARS AFTER MARATHON 
On June 23, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States changed the 
bankruptcy landscape once again in a case complicated enough to make Jus-
tice Roberts quote Dickens.165  In Stern v. Marshall, the Court held that an 
  
 159. Id. at 44; see also Scott & Robinson, supra note 116, at 3 (summarizing 
Langenkamp and Grandfinanceria as meaning a creditor who files a proof of claim 
submits to the jurisdiction of a bankruptcy court for any counterclaims against the 
creditor).  
 160. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 322-23 (1995) (Stevens, 
J., dissenting).  
 161. The National Bankruptcy Review Commission is an independent commis-
sion established pursuant to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
394, 108 Stat. 4106, to investigate the bankruptcy system and submit a report.  NBRC 
Fact Sheet, NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMMISSION (Aug. 12, 1997), http:/ 
/govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/facts.html.  They ceased to exist by operation of law on 
November 19, 1997.  NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMMISSION (Nov. 26, 1997), 
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/. 
 162. NAT’L BANKR. COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS, 734 
(1997), http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/nbrc/report/17bjuris.pdf.  
 163. Id. at 735; NORTON, supra note 124, § 4:41.  
 164. 1 NORTON, supra note 123, § 4:41.  
 165. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2600 (U.S. 2011) (“This ‘suit has, in 
course of time, become so complicated, that . . . no two . . . lawyers can talk about it 
for five minutes, without coming to a total disagreement as to all the premises.  Innu-
merable children have been born into the cause: innumerable young people have mar-
ried into it;’ and, sadly, the original parties ‘have died out of it.’  A ‘long procession 
of [judges] has come in and gone out’ during that time, and still the suit ‘drags its 
weary length before the Court.’”). 
17
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Article I court could not issue a final order adjudicating a counterclaim for 
tortious interference, and in doing so declared 28 U.S.C section 157(b)(2)(C) 
unconstitutional.166 
A.  Background 
Stern v. Marshall has a long and complicated past.  The case was born 
from a marriage between Vickie Lynn Marshall (also known as Anna Nicole 
Smith) and J. Howard Marshall II.167  Vickie married eighty-nine-year-old oil 
tycoon Howard Marshall in 1994.168  On July 13, 1994, E. Pierce Marshall 
was given power of attorney over Howard Marshall’s estate, and made How-
ard Marshall’s living trust irrevocable.169  This change meant Vickie could no 
longer be named as a beneficiary, even though Howard Marshall had alleg-
edly promised to leave half his estate to her.170  Howard also signed a will 
that stated that all of his assets not already in the living trust would be trans-
ferred to his trust upon death.171  Vickie believed that Howard’s son, E. Pierce 
Marshall, fraudulently induced Howard senior into making the trust irrevoca-
ble and filed a suit in a Texas probate court against Pierce Marshall.172  The 
suit was filed before Howard Marshall’s death, because Howard could not 
change the trust; however, about five months after the suit was filed, Howard 
Marshall died.173   
Shortly after Howard’s death, Vickie filed for bankruptcy relief in a 
California bankruptcy court because of an $830,000 judgment against Vickie 
for sexual harassment of her child’s nanny.174  Pierce filed a claim for defa-
mation in Vickie’s bankruptcy case.175  He also sought a declaration that the 
claim was non-dischargeable.176  Vickie asserted a counterclaim in the bank-
ruptcy case against Pierce for tortious interference in the fortune that Vickie 
  
 166. Id. at 2620.  
 167. Id. at 2600; Rosenblum & Friedman, supra note 122, at 1. 
 168. Rosenblum & Friedman, supra note 122, at 1.  
 169. In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118, 1122, 1125 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d and 
remanded sub nom. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006). 
 170. Id. at 1122, 1129. 
 171. In re Marshall, 600 F.3d 1037, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2010),  aff’d sub nom. Stern 
v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (U.S. 2011); Rosenblum & Friedman, supra note 122, at 
1.  
 172. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 173. In re Marshall, 392 F.3d at 1124-25.  
 174. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601; Charles Lane, Anna Nicole Smith’s Supreme Fight:  
Justices Hear Celebrity’s Bid for Cut of Late Husband’s Riches, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 
2006, http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/02/28 /AR200 
022800142_pf.html.  
 175. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 176. Id.  
18
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expected from Howard.177  Vickie eventually won summary judgment on 
Pierce’s defamation complaint, and a bankruptcy court judge found in favor 
of Vickie on the tortious interference claim and ordered Pierce to pay over 
$400 million in damages.178   
After the bankruptcy court entered its judgment, Vickie nonsuited her 
claims against Pierce in the Texas probate case.179  However, after a five-
month jury trial, the Texas probate court found in favor of Pierce and held 
that the will and trust were valid.180  Pierce then appealed the bankruptcy 
judgment to the California federal district court,181 which found that the bank-
ruptcy counterclaim was not a core proceeding, despite the literal language of 
the statute.182  Accordingly, the district court held that the bankruptcy court’s 
judgment was not final and the probate court was not entitled to preclusive 
effect.183  Therefore, the district court independently reviewed the record and 
upheld the bankruptcy court’s judgment for Vickie.184  
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court and found that the court 
should not have decided a probate claim because of the “probate excep-
tion.”185  The probate exception is a doctrine that gives states sole jurisdiction 
over probate proceedings and forbids federal courts from exercising jurisdic-
tion over probate cases or cases that would interfere with probate proceedings 
or take control over assets in the state’s custody.186  The Ninth Circuit found 
that Vickie’s tort claim interfered with the Texas probate court’s proceedings, 
that the district court did not have jurisdiction over it, and that the probate 
  
 177. Id.  
 178. Id.  Vickie was awarded over $400 million in compensatory damages and 
$25 million in punitive damages.  Id.; see also In re Marshall, 253 B.R. 550, 561 
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000), adopted as modified, 275 B.R. 5 (C.D. Cal. 2002), vacated 
and remanded, 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Marshall 
v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006). 
 179. In re Marshall, 600 F.3d 1037, 1046 (9th Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Stern v. 
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
 180. Id. at 1047. 
 181. Id.   
 182. Id. at 1048. 
 183. Id.   
 184. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2602 (2011); In re Marshall, 264 B.R. 
609, 631 (C.D. Cal. 2001).  
 185. In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004), rev’d and remanded sub 
nom. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006).  The Ninth Circuit said a related 
proceeding “is whether the outcome of the proceeding could conceivably have any 
effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.”  In re Marshall, 600 F.3d at 
1055.  Furthermore, “[a]n action is related to bankruptcy if the outcome could alter 
the debtor’s right, liabilities, options, or freedom of action (either positively or nega-
tively) and which in any way impacts upon the handling and administration of the 
bankrupt estate.”  Id. 
 186. In re Marshall, 392 F.3d at 1133.  
19
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court’s ruling was binding on the district court.187  The Ninth Circuit ordered 
the district court to vacate the bankruptcy court’s judgment against Pierce 
because the federal bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction over the probate 
matter.188  
In 2006, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Ninth Cir-
cuit’s opinion on Stern and held that the “probate exception” did not govern 
the claim; therefore, the district court’s judgment ordering Pierce to pay 
Vickie $44.3 million was upheld.189  The Supreme Court clarified that federal 
jurisdiction over probate matters in diversity cases is allowed unless the case 
concerns “divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees” or “the probate or 
annulment of a will and the administration of a decedent’s estate.”190  Federal 
courts are prohibited from hearing the latter claims even if diversity jurisdic-
tion exists.191  The Court noted that Vickie’s claim was a diversity action and 
did not fall in one of the prohibited categories.192  Therefore, the Court de-
termined that the district court had proper subject matter jurisdiction over the 
tortious interference claim.193 
On remand, the Ninth Circuit held that the bankruptcy court did not 
have core jurisdiction because while the claim met Congress’ definition of 
core, it did not arise under Title 11; therefore, the bankruptcy court’s decision 
was not a final judgment.194  Because the bankruptcy court’s decision was not 
a final judgment, the Texas probate court was the first final judgment and 
therefore had preclusive effect.195  The case was appealed again, and the Su-
preme Court again granted certiorari on the issue of whether the bankruptcy 
court had the authority to enter a final judgment on the tortious interference 
claim.196 
B.  Majority 
This time the Supreme Court had to determine if the bankruptcy court 
could enter a final judgment on the counterclaim, and, if so, whether that 
judgment would be constitutional.197  The Court first looked at the statute that 
defines “core” proceedings, 28 U.S.C. section 157(b)(2), which includes 
“counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against the es-
  
 187. Id. at 1136.  
 188. Id. at 1137.  
 189. Marshall, 547 U.S. at 304, 314. 
 190. Id. at 308, 311.  
 191. Id. at 312. 
 192. Id.  
 193. Id. at 315.  
 194. In re Marshall, 600 F.3d 1037, 1060-61, aff’d sub nom. Stern v. Marshall, 
131 S. Ct. 2594 (U.S. 2011). 
 195. Id. 
 196. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 63 (2010). 
 197. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2600 (2011).  
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tate.”198  The Court found that by its plain language the statute made the tor-
tious interference counterclaim core, which meant that the bankruptcy court 
could enter a final judgment on the counterclaim.199  However, Vickie’s vic-
tory did not last long because the Court went on to hold that the statute could 
not constitutionally allow bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments on coun-
terclaims because doing so would infringe on the domain of Article III 
courts.200  The Court held that Congress could not constitutionally give legis-
lative courts the power to finally adjudicate common law counterclaims 
which can be independently resolved in a state law action without ruling on 
the creditor’s proof of claim in the bankruptcy action.201  In so doing, the 
Court waded into a two-century old debate on the constitutional authority of 
Article I bankruptcy judges.202  
In striking down section 157(b)(2), the majority emphasized the impor-
tance of maintaining the separation of powers of the judicial and legislative 
branches and reserving judicial adjudication to Article III courts. 203  The 
Court also recounted the injustice of king-controlled courts in England, which 
led to the creation of American constitutional protections for Article III 
judges.204  The majority stated that judges need “[c]lear heads . . . and honest 
hearts” which is achieved by the life tenure and salary protection of Article 
III judges.205  Accordingly, only judges protected from ruler-coercion by Ar-
ticle III may decide matters of common law and constitutional law.206  
After this recitation of the historical importance of Article III protec-
tions, the Court discussed whether the convoluted public rights exception 
applied to this claim.207  The Court discussed the exception, as laid out in 
Marathon, Union Carbide, Schor, and Grandfinanciera.208 The Stern Court 
did not precisely verbalize a definition of “public rights,” which is central to 
the issue of whether Article I judges are allowed to adjudicate a claim.209  The 
Court instead compared Vickie’s claim to the previous definitions of the pub-
lic rights exception and concluded that, while those definitions had been in-
consistent, the common law tortious interference counterclaim did not fit 
within any of them.210  The Court refused to expand the definition.211  The 
  
 198. Id. at 2063; see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2006). 
 199. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2605.  The Court refused Pierce’s argument that there are 
core claims that do not arise under Title 11.  Id.  
 200. Id. at 2608.  
 201. Id. at 2611.  
 202. Id. at 2611-12. 
 203. Id. at 2609.  
 204. Id. 
 205. Id.  
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. at 2609-10. 
 208. Id. at 2610-15.  
 209. Id. at 2615.  
 210. Id. at 2614.   
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Court also quickly dismissed the idea that bankruptcy courts were adjuncts of 
district courts.212  This idea was a theory that Congress tried in previous bank-
ruptcy acts to achieve constitutionality by claiming that bankruptcy courts 
were merely acting on behalf of, and part of, Article III district courts.213  The 
Court noted that district courts review the bankruptcy courts’ judgments only 
under limited circumstances and give deference to the bankruptcy judges’ 
findings of facts, thereby giving them broad powers and independence from 
the district courts.214 
The majority also held that Pierce clearly consented to the bankruptcy 
court’s authority to hear his claim against Vickie for defamation because he 
did not object once to the court’s jurisdiction during the entire litigation proc-
ess.215  However, the Court held that merely filing a proof of claim did not 
imply consent to adjudication by Article I judges for Vickie’s claim for tor-
tious interference against Pierce because,216 unlike in Katchen and Langenk-
amp, resolving the counterclaim in Vickie’s case was not necessary to resolv-
ing the bankruptcy claim.217  The Court noted that the bankruptcy judge in the 
current case had to decide legal and factual issues separate from the bank-
ruptcy proof of claim or the defamation claim.218  During this discussion, the 
Court resurrected the specter of summary/plenary jurisdiction from its 
grave.219  Finally, the Court also departed from Schor and Union Carbide’s 
method of weighing the efficiency of Article I adjudication while deciding 
whether the legislative court had authority to decide the case and forbade any 
further chipping away at the authority of the judicial branch.220  The Supreme 
Court realized that prohibiting Article I judges from deciding some cases 
would cause some inefficiency but declared that the integrity of the Constitu-
tion outweighed this concern.221  The majority also stated that its holding was 
narrow and that it would have little effect on the bankruptcy system.222  How-
ever, by striking part of the bankruptcy code as unconstitutional223 and failing 
  
 211. See id. at 2611.   
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 2610-11. 
 215. Id. at 2608.  
 216. Id. at 2611. 
 217. Id. at 2616 (citing Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42 (1990); Katchen v. 
Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966)). 
 218. Id. at 2617.  
 219. See id. at 2616-17.  
 220. Id. at 2620.  
 221. Specifically, the Court eloquently stated that “[i]t goes without saying that 
‘the fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitat-
ing functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the 
Constitution.’”  Id. at 2619 (quoting I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)). 
 222. Id. at 2620.  
 223. Id. 
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to clearly define the limits of Article I authority, the Court did change bank-
ruptcy litigation in the lower courts.  
C.  Dissent 
The dissent in Stern followed the precedent of Schor and Union Carbide 
and argued that a pragmatic balancing approach be used to determine if the 
Article I court encroached on other branches of the government or was not 
impartial.224  The dissent favorably reiterated Schor’s factors for deciding 
whether Article I adjudication of a claim is appropriate and applied them to 
the instant case.225  The dissent also pointed to the majority’s complicated 
explanation of public rights and used it as support that determination of the 
constitutionality of non-Article III adjudication should be “searching.”226  It 
further argued that under Langenkamp and Grandfinanciera, Pierce Marshall 
should be held to have consented to the counterclaim by filing his proof of 
claim.227  Then, the dissent pointed out the practical disadvantages of broad 
Article III interpretation, including inefficiency, delays, and forum shopping, 
using hypotheticals.228 Further, it questioned whether the majority meant to 
re-question the validity of other Article I courts, like the CFTC in Schor 
through this decision.229  In the end, Stern left bankruptcy judges with more 
questions than answers and has caused delay, uncertainty, and added expense 
in bankruptcy cases.230  
IV.  THE WORLD AFTER STERN 
In the fallout subsequent to the lengthy Stern opinion, many scholars 
have suggested outcomes as general as inefficiency to as specific as prohibi-
tions against Article I judges adjudicating federal avoidance claims.231  While 
there are very few issues that seem crystal clear in following the Supreme 
Court’s opinion, there is one conclusion that bankruptcy judges agree on: 
Stern leaves many questions unanswered.  This Comment strives to aid prac-
titioners in navigating bankruptcy litigation post-Stern.  Therefore, the subse-
quent sections illustrate how courts have decided if claims are core or non-
core, detail how different jurisdictions need consent, and explain how courts 
  
 224. Id. at 2625-26 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 225. Id. at 2626.  
 226. Id. at 2625.  
 227. See id. at 2629.  
 228. Id. at 2630. 
 229. Id. at 2623.  
 230. See supra Part III.  
 231. Richard Lieb, The Supreme Court, in Stern v. Marshall, by Applying Article 
III of the Constitution Further Limited the Statutory Authority of Bankruptcy Courts 
to Issue Final Orders, 20 J. BANKR. L. & PRACT. 461 (2011).  
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have ruled with regard to authority to enter final judgments in a majority of 
common state law claims.   
A.  Categorizing Claims as Core or Non-core 
One of the initial issues that bankruptcy courts must decide is whether a 
claim is “core” or “non-core.”232  The majority of courts have held that in 
order for a proceeding to be core, it must be defined as core under 28 U.S.C. 
section 157, and the bankruptcy judge must also have authority under the 
Constitution to enter a final adjudication.233  The latter part of this test is 
where some courts look to Stern to decide if the claim is traditionally a state 
law claim and thus cannot be constitutionally adjudicated by an Article I 
court or if it fits the public rights exception and can be adjudicated.234  Other 
courts have emphasized the narrowness of Stern’s holding and have held that 
bankruptcy courts may still enter a final judgment on all other types of pro-
ceedings authorized under 28 U.S.C. section 157, except the specific type of 
state law counterclaim, tortious interference, found invalid in Stern.235  
Once the bankruptcy judge has determined whether the claim is core or 
non-core, then the judge knows how to treat the claim.  In a core matter that 
arises in or under Title 11 and may be constitutionally adjudicated, the bank-
ruptcy judge may enter final orders, subject to appellate review by the district 
court.236  The vast majority of district courts have determined that if the mat-
ter is statutorily defined as core, but cannot be constitutionally decided by 
Article I courts, then the bankruptcy courts should treat the matter like non-
core issues.237  
  
 232. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 6603-04. 
 233. Burtch v. Huston (In re USDigital, Inc.), 461 B.R. 276, 279 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2011); In re Heller Ehrman LLP, No. 08-32514DM, 2011 WL 4542512, at *1 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011), adopted 464 B.R. 348 (N.D. Cal. 2011); In re Okwonna-
Felix, No. 10-31663-H4-13, 2011 WL 3421561, at *4 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 
2011). 
 234. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2611.  
 235. See, e.g., Brook v. Ford Motor Credit Co. (In re Peacock), 455 B.R. 810, 812 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011). 
 236. In re USDigital, Inc., 461 B.R. at 279; In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 
457 B.R. 692, 698-99 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 237. See, e.g., RES-GA Four LLC v. Avalon Builders of GA LLC, No. 5:10-CV-
463 MTT, 2012 WL 13544 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 4, 2012) (finding that bankruptcy courts 
have the ability to hear and submit proposed findings of fact in issues related to title 
11 proceeding); Field v. Estate of Kapoika (In re Maui Indus. Loan Fin. Co.), No. 11-
00552 LEK, 2011 WL 6934571, at *10 (D. Haw. Dec. 29, 2011) (holding that a bank-
ruptcy court can still hear a non-constitutional core claim and give proposed findings 
of fact to the district court); Justmed, Inc. v. Byce (In re Byce), No. 1:11-CV-00378-
BLW, 2011 WL 6210938, at *2 (D. Idaho Dec. 14, 2011); In re El–Atari, No. 
1:11CV1090 LMD/IDD, 2011 WL 5828013, at *4 (E.D. Va. Nov. 18, 2011)  (finding 
that the “majority of district courts have also concluded that the bankruptcy courts 
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Matters that are merely “related to” a bankruptcy proceeding are non-
core matters.238  In non-core matters the bankruptcy judge may enter pro-
posed findings of fact, but these findings are subject to de novo review by the 
district court.239  As opposed to treating unconstitutionally core claims as 
non-core, at least two courts have found that if a matter is statutorily core, but 
not constitutionally core, then the court cannot even hear the claim.240  In In 
  
retain the power to hear but not decide state law claims”); In re Extended Stay, Inc., 
466 B.R. 188, 203 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding bankruptcy courts may submit proposed 
findings of fact in unconstitutionally core claims); City Bank v. Compass Bank, No. 
EP-11-MC-372-KC, 2011 WL 5442092, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2011); In re Mortg. 
Store, Inc., 464 B.R. 421, 427 (D. Haw. Oct. 5, 2011) (agreeing with Paloian v. Am. 
Express Co. (In re Canopy Fin.), 464 B.R. 770 (N.D. Ill. 2011) that bankruptcy courts 
may hear and propose findings of fact for unconstitutionally core proceedings); Picard 
v. Flinn Invs., LLC, 463 B.R. 280, 288 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (noting that even if the bank-
ruptcy court cannot resolve fraudulent transfer claims, it may still recommend find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law to Article III courts); In re Canopy Fin., 464 B.R. 
at 774 (finding that Stern removed the unconstitutional core claims from the core 
category and relegated them to the related to category); Kelley v. JPMorgan Chase & 
Co., 464 B.R. 854, 859 (D. Minn. 2011) (holding a bankruptcy court could hear, and 
propose findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court, even if a fraudu-
lent transfer claim was found to not be constitutionally core); Paloian v. LaSalle Bank 
Nat’l Ass’n (In re Doctors Hosp. of Hyde Park, Inc.), 463 B.R. 93, 100 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. 2011) (holding that if a claim is not constitutionally core it falls within the “re-
lated-to” jurisdiction of bankruptcy judges); Nation’s Captial Child & Family Dev., 
Inc. v. Marylyn Tree LLC (In re Nation’s Capital Child & Family Dev., Inc.), No. 09-
00576, 2011 WL 6001086, at *1 (Bankr. D.D.C. Nov. 30, 2011); Gugino v. Canyon 
Cnty. (In re Bujak), No. 10-03569-JDP, 2011 WL 5326038, at *4 (Bankr. D. Idaho 
Nov. 3, 2011); Tabor v. Kelly (In re Davis), No. 05-15794-GWE, 2011 WL 5429095, 
at *15 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2011) (holding that a court may prepare proposed 
findings of fact for de novo review in unconstitutionally core claims). 
 238. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(3) (2006).  
 239. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 462 B.R. 
457, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Canopy Fin., Inc., 464 B.R. at 772; In re USDigital, 
Inc., 461 B.R. at 283; Levey v. Hanson’s Window & Constr. Inc. (In re Republic 
Windows & Doors, LLC), 460 B.R. 511, 514 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011); Menotte v. 
United States (In re Custom Contractors, LLC), 462 B.R. 901, 905 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2011); D & B Swine Farms, Inc. v. Murphy-Brown, LLC (In re D & B Swine Farms, 
Inc.), No. 09-02813-8-JRL, 2011 WL 6013218, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2011); 
Oxford Expositions, LLC v. Questex Media Grp. (In re Oxford Expositions, LLC), 
466 B.R. 818, 828 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.); Gecker v. Flynn (In re Emerald Casino, Inc.), 
459 B.R. 298, 300 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.). 
 240. Samson v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth), No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042, at 
*11–12 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug.1, 2011), order amended on denial of reconsideration 
by 463 B.R. 896 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2012); see also Palazzola v. City of Toledo (In re 
Palazzola), No. 09-37696, 2011 WL 3667624, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Aug. 22, 
2011) (holding that because the court had no authority to hear and determine the per-
sonal tort claim under the Constitution as it was a private right, and the claim is not a 
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re Blixseth, a Montana bankruptcy court held that while it was defined by 
statute as core, a fraudulent conveyance claim was a state law claim that did 
not fall within the public rights exception.241  The court then held that the 
claim was a private right that must be decided by an Article III court, and the 
bankruptcy court could “in no case hear the claim.”242  The court granted the 
parties time to move the claim to the district court.243  However, Blixseth has 
since been overruled and the decision labeled “flawed” because Stern did not 
deprive courts of the subject matter jurisdiction to at least hear the claim.244  
B.  Consent to Article I Adjudication 
Consent is also an important issue after Stern.  The vast majority of 
courts have held that parties may expressly or impliedly consent to final 
judgments in non-core matters245 by actions like expressly consenting on the 
record,246 consenting to final judgments on counterclaims by the bankruptcy 
court in pleadings,247 not arguing that the court has a lack of authority to enter 
  
“related to” claim under 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1), then the court has no subject matter 
jurisdiction). 
 241. In re Blixseth, 2011 WL 3274042, at *11.  
 242. Id. at *12.  
 243. Id. 
 244. Samson v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth), 463 B.R. 896, 906 (Bankr. D. Mont. 
2012), order amended on denial of reconsideration by 463 B.R. 896 (Bankr. D. Mont. 
2012); see also In re Yellowstone Mountain Club, LLC, 460 B.R. 254, 280 (Bankr. 
D. Mont. 2011) (holding “Blixseth’s standing objection to this Court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction is overruled”). 
 245. Menotte v. United States (In re Custom Contractors, LLC), 462 B.R. 901, 
908-09 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011); Hagan v. Classic Prod. Corp. (In re Wilderness 
Crossings, LLC), No. 09-14547, 2011 WL 5417098 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 
2011); Pro-Pac Inc. v. Chapes (In re Pro–Pac, Inc.), 456 B.R. 894, 902-03 (Bankr. 
E.D. Wis. 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom. WOW Logistics Co. v. Pro–Pac, Inc., 
No. 11-CV-1075-JPS, 2012 WL 3495391 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 14, 2012); Oxford Exposi-
tions v. Questex Media Grp. (In re Oxford Expositions, LLC), 466 B.R. 818, 828 
(Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2011); In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 705 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (noting that judges may enter final judgments in non-core 
matters if the parties consent pursuant to § 157(c)(2) which the Supreme Court has 
not held as unconstitutional). 
 246. Janis v. Wefald (In re Wefald), No. 10-08068-8-SWH, 2011 WL 6001134, at 
*1 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Nov. 30, 2011); Reinke v. N.W. Tr. Servs. Inc. (In re Reinke), 
No. 09-19609, 2011 WL 5079561, at *5 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Oct. 26, 2011); see 
Frontier Energy LLC v. Aurora Energy, Ltd. (In re Aurora Oil & Gas Corp.), 460 
B.R. 470, 476 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011).  
 247. Mercury Cos. v. FNF Sec. Acquisition, Inc., 460 B.R. 778, 781-82 (D. Colo. 
2011) (noting that the parties consented by admitting in the pleadings that the bank-
ruptcy court had jurisdiction over the action, and if that was not enough the defen-
dants consented by waiting nineteen months to challenge the authority of the court to 
enter orders and file counterclaims); In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 457 B.R. 
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final judgments while making substantial arguments before the court,248 par-
ticipating in extensive litigation without objecting to the bankruptcy court’s 
authority to enter a final judgment,249 or even filing multiple pleadings with-
out objecting to the court’s authority.250  Some courts make it more difficult 
to consent to final judgments in non-core matters.251  A Michigan bankruptcy 
court stated that it needed “a knowing waiver of [the party’s] right to have an 
Article III judge, as opposed to [a bankruptcy judge], make the final decision. 
. . .”252  Finally, a small minority of courts comment that it is unclear whether 
parties may consent to a final judgment in a non-core proceeding.253   
In re Safety Harbor Resort and Spa discussed in detail the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence concerning consent and held that Stern meant that fil-
ing a proof of claim was not enough to consent to a state law counterclaim 
unless the claim stemmed from the bankruptcy itself or would be resolved in 
the allowance process.254  However, the In re Safety Harbor court noted that 
  
692, 700-02 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (noting Stern did not alter the system of final 
adjudication by consent, and both parties expressly consented to final adjudication in 
their pleadings, and that consent cannot be withdrawn without good cause). 
 248. Bayonne Med. Ctr. v. Bayonne/Omini Dev., LLC (In re Bayonne Med. Ctr.), 
No. 07-15195, 2011 WL 5900960, at *6 (Bankr. D. N.J. Nov. 1, 2011) (noting that 
consent to non-core matter was found after party plead consent, went through oral 
arguments opposing summary judgment, and only then tried to withdraw consent, and 
stating that “[t]he plaintiffs late-day tactical change of heart will not be permitted”). 
 249. Adams Nat’l Bank v. GB Herndon & Assocs., Inc. (In re GB Herndon & 
Assocs.), 459 B.R. 148, 157-58 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2011) (finding consent where the 
parties went through proceedings and final judgment, and did not object to bankruptcy 
court’s authority until final judgment was entered); Brook v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 
LLC (In re Peacock), 455 B.R. 810, 813-14 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011) (finding consent 
when bankruptcy court’s authority was not challenged until trial was one week away). 
 250. Henderson v. Cmty. Bank of Miss. (In re Evans), 464 B.R. 272, 277 n.3 
(Bankr. S.D. Miss. 2011). 
 251. See Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 462 
B.R. 457, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).  “Consenting” in pleadings to final judgments by 
bankruptcy courts to non-core matters is not enough for actual consent.  Id. at 471.  
Further, the court distinguished the instant case from other cases where the party 
participated in extensive litigation, lost at trial, or argued a substantial proceeding 
without raising the argument that the bankruptcy court did not have  authority to make 
a final adjudication.  Id. at 472.  See also Tabor v. Kelly (In re Davis), No. 05-15794-
GWE, 2011 WL 5429095, at *13 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2011) (finding an invol-
untary petition is not consent to a final judgment on non-core proceedings); Meoli v. 
Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 318, 339-40 (Bankr. 
W.D. Mich. 2011). 
 252. In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 456 B.R. at 339.  
 253. See Burtch v. Huston (In re USDigital, Inc.), 461 B.R. 276, 279 (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2011). 
 254. In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 713 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 
2011); see also Ortiz v. Aurora Health Care, Inc. (In re Ortiz), 665 F.3d 906, 913-14 
 
27
Wright: Wright: From Stem to Stern
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2012
File: WrightPaginated.docx Created on:  6/24/13 10:45 PM Last Printed: 10/23/13 8:41 PM 
1186 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 77  
 
the Supreme Court did not hold 28 U.S.C. section 157(c)(2) unconstitutional, 
which allows parties to consent to final judgments in non-core proceedings.255  
The court also noted that the vast majority of circuit courts have upheld the 
constitutionality of the Federal Magistrate Statute, which allowed “parties to 
consent to an Article I judge entering final judgments.”256  
Put another way by Development Specialists, Inc., by filing a proof of 
claim the creditor consents only to matters that are necessary to resolve that 
claim, not to other matters such as state law counterclaims.257  Further, De-
velopment Specialists, Inc. reminds parties that consenting to jurisdiction, 
which every related-to claim would have, “is not the same as consenting to 
the entry of a final determination by a non-Article III tribunal[.]”258  
Most courts believe that Stern should be read narrowly.259  However, 
some bankruptcy judges note that the Stern Court was inconsistent; the Court 
made statements supporting a broad interpretation while insisting it was writ-
ing a very narrow holding.260  Those courts that are unclear on Stern’s effect 
on their ability to enter a final judgment have withdrawn the matter from 
  
(7th Cir. 2011) (following Stern and holding that a debtor’s filing of a proof of claim 
did not mean the debtor consented to the creditor’s state law counterclaim). 
 255. In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. at 718. 
 256. Id.  
 257. See Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, 462 
B.R. 457, 464 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 258. Id. at 471.  
 259. Justmed Inc. v. Byce (In re Byce), No. 1:11-CV-00378-BLW, 2011 WL 
6210938, at *2 (D. Idaho Dec. 14, 2011) (commenting that Stern only applied to state 
law counterclaims that would not be finally resolved in the process of adjudicating the 
creditor’s proof of claim); Mercury Cos. v. FNF Sec. Acquisition, Inc., 460 B.R. 778, 
783 (D. Colo. 2011) (finding that the only case covered by Stern is a counterclaim 
brought against a creditor that had filed a proof of claim against the bankruptcy es-
tate); Menotte v. United States (In re Custom Contractors, LLC), 462 B.R. 901, 906 
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) (listing parts of the opinion that support that the opinion 
should be read narrowly); Gugino v. Canyon Cnty. (In re Bujak), No. 10-03569-JDP, 
2011 WL 5326038, at *1-2 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 3, 2011) (choosing to see Stern as a 
narrow holding, and “discount[ing] those who argue the sky is falling”); In re Heller 
Ehrman LLP, No. 08-32514DM, 2011 WL 4542512, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 
2011), adopted, 464 B.R. 348 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (finding Stern does not affect a bank-
ruptcy court’s authorization to enter final judgments in other core proceedings under 
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)); Brook v. Ford Motor Credit Co., LLC (In re Peacock), 455 
B.R. 810, 812 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011); In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 
at 705 (stating that Stern merely held that in “one isolated instance” authority was 
exceeded by entering a final judgment on a counterclaim not necessarily resolved in 
ruling on the creditor’s proof of claim). 
 260. Turturici v. Nat’l Mortg. Servicing, LP, No. CIV S-10-2853 KJM, 2011 WL 
4480169, at *3 n.3 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 26, 2011); Burtch v. Huston (In re USDigital, 
Inc.), 461 B.R. 276, 288-89 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (discussing parts of the opinion 
that could be read to support a broad reading). 
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bankruptcy courts to “conserve resources and avoid piecemeal litigation.”261  
Other courts ignore the Supreme Court’s express affirmations and interpret 
Stern broadly to mean that any bankruptcy issue that the court determines is a 
private right may not be adjudicated.262  The latter interpretation is broad 
because it does not apply Stern to just counterclaims but also determines what 
fits the public right exception, an exception that the Supreme Court has not 
even clearly defined.263  However, almost all bankruptcy judges agree that 
Stern did not affect subject matter jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts; that 
is, the bankruptcy courts still have the authority to hear claims that arise un-
der Title 11 or are related to the bankruptcy proceedings, whether or not they 
can enter a final binding judgment on the claims. 264 
Finally, it is interesting to note that some bankruptcy judges read Stern 
as affecting them personally and have switched to “I” instead of “we” or “this 
court.”265  One bankruptcy judge even suggested that he was offended at the 
suggestion that he would be improperly influenced without Article III protec-
tions, though admitted that Stern’s reasoning was sound.266 
  
 261. Michaelson v. Golden Gate Private Equity, Inc. (In re Appleseed’s Interme-
diate Holdings, LLC), No. 11-10160, 2011 WL 6293251, at *3-4 (D. Del. Dec. 15, 
2011). 
 262. Retired Partners of Coudert Bros. Trust v. Baker & Makenzie LLP (In re 
Coudert Bros.), No. 11-2785 CM, 2011 WL 5593147, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011) 
(interpreting Stern as holding claims that are private rights cannot be finally adjudi-
cated by Article I legislative courts). 
 263. See id. at *4. 
 264. See, e.g., In re Extended Stay, Inc., 466 B.R. 188, 200-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); 
Levey v. Hanson’s Window & Constr. Inc. (In re Republic Windows & Doors, LLC), 
460 B.R. 511, 515-16 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011); Goldstein v. Eby-Brown, Inc. (In re 
Universal Mktg., Inc.), 459 B.R. 573, 577 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (noting that Stern 
does not affect the authority to hear certain claims, just whether the court can enter a 
final order or not); Hagan v. Classics Prods. Corp. (In re Wilderness Crossings, LLC), 
No. 09-14547, 2011 WL 5417098, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. Nov. 8, 2011); In re 
LLS Am., LLC, No. 09-06194-PCW11, 2011 WL 4005447, at *2-3 (Bankr. E.D. 
Wash. Sept. 8, 2011).  
 265. Menotte v. United States (In re 
Custom Contractors, LLC), 462 B.R. 901, 908 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011); BankUnited 
Fin. Corp. v. FDIC (In re BankUnited Fin. Corp.), 462 B.R. 885, 890 (Bankr. S.D. 
Fla. 2011); In re BearingPoint, Inc., 453 B.R. 486, 488 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
      266. Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 318, 
322 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (“I may take umbrage at the suggestion that my inde-
pendence as a decision-maker would ever be compromised by the threat of not being 
reappointed or having my compensation reduced.  But there remains the appearance 
that I could be so influenced and that alone is enough.”).  And later the judge noted “I 
typically write my opinions now in the third person in order to impress upon the 
reader that I am speaking on behalf of the court.  However, [the party’s] motion calls 
into question whether I am acting on behalf of any court.  Therefore, I have chosen 
the first person in this instance.”  Id. at 320 n.1. 
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C.  Breach of Contract Claims 
Following Stern, bankruptcy courts cannot agree on how to treat claims 
for breach of contract.  Overall, the resolution seems to be fact specific, de-
pendent on whether the breach of contract claim is necessary to resolve the 
creditor’s proof of claim.  
The Court in Stern reasoned that Vickie’s tortious interference claim 
could not be finally decided by the bankruptcy court because it was a state 
law counterclaim which had different legal and factual issues than the credi-
tor’s claim.  Based on this reasoning, some courts have held that a state law 
counterclaim for breach of contract, which necessarily is resolved as part of 
the creditor’s claim, may be constitutionally finally adjudicated by the bank-
ruptcy judge.267  For example, when a proof of claim is filed for a lease and 
the state law claim is breach of the lease contract, then the state law claim is 
necessarily resolved with the bankruptcy case.268  This example is more 
clearly demonstrated by a Kentucky bankruptcy court, which held that Stern 
did not remove the authority to enter final judgments on breach of contract 
counterclaims.269  Instead, the Kentucky court read Stern as authorizing the 
court to look at each counterclaim on a case-by-case basis.270 The court fi-
nally held that because the creditor’s claim was on a note and mortgage and 
the allegedly breached contract was the same note and mortgage, the counter-
claim was necessarily resolved by determining the extent of the claim on the 
loan; thus, the bankruptcy court had the authority to enter a final judgment in 
the matter.271  
Conversely, other courts have expressly held that claims for breach of 
contract involved independent state law, were not constitutionally core, and 
  
 267. Black, Davis & Shue Agency, Inc. v. Frontier Ins. Co. in Rehab. (In re 
Black, Davis & Shue Agency, Inc.), 471 B.R. 381, 404-05 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 2012); 
Adams Nat’l Bank v. GB Herndon & Assocs., Inc.  (In re GB Herndon & Assocs., 
Inc.), 459 B.R. 148, 165 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2011); Oxford Expositions v. Questex Media 
Grp. (In re Oxford Expositions, LLC), 466 B.R. 818, 830 (Bankr. N.D. Miss. 2011) 
(holding that deciding the breach of contract claim was necessary to determine dam-
ages and remedial relief, and was core under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A), (B), and (O)); 
In re B.C. Rogers Poultry, Inc., 455 B.R. 524, 548, 548 n.31 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 
2011). 
 268. Walter v. Freeway Foods, Inc. (In re Freeway Foods of Greensboro, Inc.), 
449 B.R. 860, 875 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2011) (finding that a cause of action for breach 
of lease agreement would necessarily be resolved in the claims process, and so the 
claim could constitutionally be decided by the bankruptcy court).  
 269. Tolliver v. Bank of Am. (In re Tolliver), 464 B.R. 720, 734 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 
2012).  
 270. Id. at 733-34 (quoting In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 715 
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011)).  
 271. Id. at 743.  
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should be treated as non-core.272  One Texas bankruptcy court, without fur-
ther discussion, simply held that a counterclaim for breach of contract could 
not be decided by the bankruptcy court in light of Stern.273  Further, a Minne-
sota bankruptcy court found that it could not even enter a grant of summary 
judgment on a state law counterclaim for breach of contract because the court 
did not have the constitutional authority to enter any dispositive order.274  
Finally, an Illinois district court held that Stern “precludes [the bankruptcy 
judges’] entry of a final judgment on any state law counterclaim that would 
bring assets into the bankruptcy estate.”275  This very broad reading of Stern 
included disallowing entry of a final judgment on a state law breach of con-
tract counterclaim.276 
D.  Breach of Fiduciary Duty 
A claim for breach of fiduciary duty has also caused a split in the bank-
ruptcy courts.  Like breach of contract claims, bankruptcy courts largely seem 
to have decided whether the claim can be finally decided by a bankruptcy 
court by looking at whether the counterclaim is necessarily resolved with the 
debtor’s claim.  However, while courts seem more evenly split on whether a 
breach of contract counterclaim is necessarily resolved with the debtor’s 
claim, more courts have found that a breach of fiduciary duty claim is not 
necessarily resolved by deciding the debtor’s underlying claim.   
An Illinois bankruptcy court held that a counterclaim for breach of fidu-
ciary duty required a determination of whether an extra-contractual fiduciary 
duty was owed to the debtor at all.277  The court found that, while this deter-
  
 272. Coudert Bros. v. Baker & Makenzie LLP (In re Coudert Bros.), No. 11-2785 
CM, 2011 WL 5593147, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011) (holding that the state law 
breach of contract claim was a private right and could not be adjudicated by an Article 
I court); Colony Beach & Tennis Club, Ltd. V. Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass’n 
(In re Colony Beach & Tennis Club Ass’n), 456 B.R. 545, 551 (M.D. Fla. 2011) 
(classifying breaches of governing partnership documents as non-core even though 
they would seem to be defined as core under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) because they were 
state law claims that could exist outside of bankruptcy); D & B Swine Farms, Inc. v. 
Murphy-Brown, LLC (In re D & B Swine Farms, Inc.), No. 09-02813-8-JRL, 2011 
WL 6013218, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Dec. 2, 2011) (holding that state law claims for 
post-petition breach of contract were originally held as core by the Court, but after 
Stern must be held as non-core).  
 273. In re Mandel, No. 10-40219, 2011 WL 4599969, at *14 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 
Sept. 30, 2011). 
 274. Stoebner v. PNY Techs. Corp. (In re Polaroid Corp.), 451 B.R. 493, 496-98 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 2011). 
 275. Emerald Casino v. Flynn (In re Emerald Casino, Inc.), 467 B.R. 128, 133 
(N.D. Ill. 2012). 
 276. Id. at 132-33. 
 277. In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 457 B.R. 692, 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 
2011). 
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mination may have some overlap with the proof of claim, it was like the state 
law counterclaim in Stern, in which the creditor’s proof of claim was not 
necessarily resolved by deciding the debtor’s original claim.278  Therefore, the 
Illinois court held that the breach of fiduciary duty claim was non-core, even 
though it fit within the definition of a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. sec-
tion 157(b)(2)(C).279  Further, a North Carolina bankruptcy court read Stern 
as having established a two-prong test for determining constitutional adjudi-
cation asking, (1) whether the action stems from the bankruptcy itself, and (2) 
whether the claim could necessarily be resolved in the allowance process.280  
The court went on to hold that proofs of claim by the estate based on a breach 
of fiduciary duty could be seen as counterclaims, but the claims did not stem 
from the bankruptcy code and it would not be necessary to determine if a 
breach of fiduciary duty occurred in order to allow the proof of claim.281 
Other courts agree with this reasoning and have found that claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty cannot be finally adjudicated constitutionally by non-
Article III courts.282  One court avoided the constitutional question of whether 
a breach of fiduciary duty claim was constitutionally core by stating that it 
fell under the “related-to” jurisdiction of the court.283   
Conversely, some courts disagree with the notion that breaches of fidu-
ciary duty should be treated as non-core.  A Texas bankruptcy court was pre-
sented with the issue of resolving a breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim 
against a creditor for stealing intellectual property from a company where 
both the debtor and creditor held officer positions.284  The court decided that, 
unlike other counterclaims in the suit, the counterclaim for breach of fiduci-
  
 278. Id.  
 279. Id.  
 280. Burns v. Dennis (In re Se. Materials, Inc.), 467 B.R. 337, 348 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. 2012). 
 281. Id. at 358.  
 282. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, No. 11 CIV. 
6337 CM, 2011 WL 6780600, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011) (holding that a breach 
of fiduciary duty claim was a private right that was not necessary to resolve in the 
proof of claim, and therefore was not constitutionally core); Reed v. Linehan (In re 
Soporex, Inc.), 463 B.R. 344, 366 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2011); Hill v. New Concept 
Energy, Inc. (In re Yazoo Pipeline Co.), 459 B.R. 636, 642 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) 
(holding that breach of fiduciary duty claim was state law in character and not neces-
sarily resolved through the claims adjudication process); McKinstry v. Sergent (In re 
Black Diamond Mining Co., LLC), No. 11-07010, 2011 WL 4433624, at *6 (Bankr. 
E.D. Ky. Sept. 21, 2011) (noting that the plaintiff’s claims probably are not defined as 
core under statute, but even if they were they are state law claims that are not neces-
sarily resolved by ruling on the proof of claim, and thus cannot be treated as core). 
 283. Samson v. Blixseth (In re Blixseth), No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042, at 
*4 (Bankr. D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2011), order amended on denial of reconsideration by 
463 B.R. 896 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2012). 
 284. In re Mandel, No. 10-40219, 2011 WL 4599969, at *17 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 
Sept. 30, 2011).  
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ary duty had to be resolved in adjudicating the creditor’s claim for breach of 
fiduciary duty against the debtor.285  Therefore, the court determined that it 
could enter a final judgment on the alleged thief’s claim.286  Other courts have 
also found that breach of fiduciary duty claims that are necessarily resolved 
with the debtor’s claim may be constitutionally decided by the bankruptcy 
court; these include a Delaware bankruptcy court which found that a breach 
of fiduciary duty was “integral to the bankruptcy case,[,]”287 and a New York 
district court in the bankruptcy of the Estate of Madoff.288 
E.  Fraudulent Transfer 
Previous Supreme Court cases dealing with fraudulent transfers like 
Granfinaciera, and Stern’s reference to those cases, have caused considerable 
debate over whether Article I courts have the authority to adjudicate fraudu-
lent transfer claims.289  Unlike breach of contract counterclaims, where a 
court’s determinations of authority tend to be fact specific, the confusion over 
whether a fraudulent transfer may be constitutionally adjudicated by an Arti-
cle I court seems historically based.   
Some courts have found that, despite being defined as core under 28 
U.S.C. section 157, fraudulent transfers cannot be constitutionally decided by 
bankruptcy courts.290  These courts have reasoned that fraudulent transfers are 
not core because they are state law counterclaims covered by Stern, and 
  
 285. Id. at *14, 17.  
 286. Id.  
 287. Miller v. Greenwich Capital Fin. Prods. Inc. (In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs., 
Inc.), 457 B.R. 314, 319-20 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011). 
 288. Picard v. Estate of Madoff, 464 B.R. 578, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (deciding 
that it was too early in the case to tell if the claim would be resolved with the proof of 
claim). 
 289. The Ninth Circuit, on November 4, 2011, invited amicus curiae briefs on the 
issue.  Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkson (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 
661 F.3d 476, 476 (9th Cir. 2011).  
 290. McCarthy v. Wells Fargo Bank (In re El-Atari), No. 1:11CV1090 LMB/IDD, 
2011 WL 5828013, at *3 (E.D. Va. Nov. 18, 2011) (finding fraudulent transfers are 
clearly related to cases under Title 11, so bankruptcy courts can hear, but not decide, 
fraudulent transfer claims); City Bank v. Compass Bank, No. EP-11-MC-372-KC, 
2011 WL 5442092, at *4 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 9, 2011) (assuming, without deciding, that 
a fraudulent transfer claim was non-core); Paloian v. Am. Express Co. (In re Canopy 
Fin., Inc.), 464 B.R. 770, 771, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (applying the non-core status to 
both state and federal law fraudulent conveyance claims); Meoli v. Huntington Nat’l 
Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 318, 338 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) 
(holding that a fraudulent transfer must be decided by an Article III court); Levey v. 
Hanson’s Window & Constr. Inc. (In re Republic Windows & Doors, LLC), 460 B.R. 
511, 514 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011) (holding that bankruptcy judges could submit find-
ings of fact and conclusions of law to district court judges for de novo review even if 
the proceeding is non-core and the parties do not consent). 
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Granfinanciera held that fraudulent transfers are common law claims that are 
private, not public, rights.291  Further, these courts reason that, while fraudu-
lent transfers are not constitutionally core, they are related to the bankruptcy, 
because if the trustee prevailed she would bring money into the estate, affect-
ing distribution to creditors.292 Therefore, these courts reason a fraudulent 
transfer can be treated as non-core and adjudicated only with the consent of 
the parties.293  
Other courts disagree, have found that fraudulent transfer claims are 
core, and have determined that bankruptcy judges can enter final judgments 
on the claims.294  These courts argue that a fraudulent conveyance claim can 
  
 291. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, No. 11 Civ. 
5337 CM, 2011 WL 6780600, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011) (holding that a fraudu-
lent conveyance claim by party with trustee standing against a third party non-creditor 
of the estate are the same facts in Granfinanciera, and therefore the claim is not a 
public right that a non-Article III court may finally adjudicate.); Dev. Specialists, Inc. 
v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP462 B.R. 457  (S.D.N.Y. 2011)  (finding 
that fraudulent conveyance counterclaim was a private right according to Granfinan-
ciera, independent of the bankruptcy proceedings, and not necessarily resolved in 
deciding proofs of claim against the estate.); Coudert Bros. v. Baker & Makenzie LLP 
(In re Coudert Bros. LLP), No. 11-2785 CM, 2011 WL 5593147, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 23, 2011) (noting that fraudulent conveyance claims are private rights under 
Granfinanciera, and so are not constitutionally decided by bankruptcy courts.); In re 
Canopy Fin., Inc., 464 B.R. at 773 (stating Stern and Granfinanciera made it clear 
that fraudulent conveyance actions should be made by Article III courts as they are 
common law suits); In re El-Atari, 2011 WL 5828013, at *4; Bayonne Med. Ctr. v. 
Bayonne/Omini Dev., LLC (In re Bayonne Med. Ctr.), No. 07-15195 MS, 2011 WL 
5900960, at *4 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2011) (finding a state law claim for the invalid-
ity and/or unenforceability of a transfer to be non-core); Tabor v. Kelly (In re Davis), 
No. 05-15794-GWE, 2011 WL 5429095, at *11 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2011) 
(holding that fraudulent conveyance claims under 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)-(2) are really 
based in state law and not public rights under Granfinanciera, and so cannot be con-
stitutionally determined by a non-Article III court); Samson v. Blixseth (In re Blix-
seth) , No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042, at *11 (Bankr D. Mont. Aug. 1, 2011), 
order amended on denial of reconsideration by 463 B.R. 896 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2012) 
(holding that fraudulent conveyance claims are private right claims that must be fi-
nally adjudicated by an Article III court, though after reconsideration the court de-
cided that it could treat the claim as non-core and propose findings of fact to a district 
court). 
 292. In re Republic Windows & Doors, LLC, 460 B.R. at 514 (holding that bank-
ruptcy judges could submit findings of fact and conclusions of law to district court 
judges for de novo review even if the proceeding is non-core and the parties do not 
consent). 
 293. Id.  
 294. Field v. Estate of Kapoika (In re Maui Indus. Loan Fin. Co.), No. 11-00552 
LEK-KSC, 2011 WL 6934571, at *9 (D. Haw. Dec. 29, 2011) (stating that fraudulent 
transfer claims “are core bankruptcy matters”); In re Canopy Fin., 464 B.R. at 772 
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (finding that fraudulent transfer claims under 28 U.S.C. § 
157(b)(2)(F) “explicitly fall into the statute’s definition of core proceedings”); 
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exist only if the conveyor is insolvent or imminently insolvent, and so the 
claim is “inextricably tied to the bankruptcy scheme.”295  These courts con-
tinue that, unlike Stern’s counterclaim, which was not necessarily decided by 
adjudicating the underlying claim, a fraudulent conveyance claim is part of 
the process of deciding whether the creditor’s proof of claim should be al-
lowed.296  Further, these courts argue that fraudulent transfer claims arise 
under sections 544(b) and 548 of the Bankruptcy Code or 28 U.S.C. section 
157(b)(2)(H) and would not exist but for bankruptcy.297  
However, some courts holding that a fraudulent conveyance claim may 
be adjudicated by an Article I court do caution that, even if fraudulent con-
veyance claims are non-core, the bankruptcy court may make proposed find-
ings of fact to the district court.298  Another way a Colorado bankruptcy court 
  
Richardson v. Checker Acquisition Corp. (In re Checker Motors Corp.), 463 B.R. 
858, 860 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012) (holding “tentatively” that it is constitutional for 
a bankruptcy court to enter final orders in a fraudulent transfer claim); Menotte v. 
United States (In re Custom Contractors, LLC), 462 B.R. 901, 905 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2011); Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 187 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2011) (noting a split in the bankruptcy courts on whether fraudulent conveyance 
claims are constitutionally core, and deciding that they are because, unlike the tortious 
interference claim in Stern, the fraudulent conveyance claims are based on federal 
statute); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Citron (In re Citron), No. 08-71442-AST, 2011 WL 
4711942, at *2 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 6, 2011) (holding that Stern does not apply to 
the fraudulent conveyance claim because it is not a “plain-vanilla state law counter-
claim”). 
 295. In re Custom Contractors, LLC, 462 B.R. at 907 (citing Duck v. Munn (In re 
Mankin), 823 F.2d 1296, 1307 n.4 (9th Cir.1987)); Gugino v. Canyon Cnty. (In re 
Bujak), No. 10-03569-JDP, 2011 WL 5326038, at *2 (Bankr. D. Idaho Nov. 3, 2011) 
(holding that the fraudulent transfer is not a state law claim and arises under the bank-
ruptcy code, and so is core); In re Heller Ehrman LLP, No. 08-32514DM, 2011 WL 
4542512, at *5 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2011) (commenting that without bank-
ruptcy the claim could not be asserted at all), adopted, 464 B.R. 348 (N.D. Cal. 2011); 
Miller v. Greenwich Capital Fin. Prods. Inc. (In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc.), 457 
B.R. 314, 319-20 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (finding that the federal and state law fraudu-
lent transfer claims arose after the party filed bankruptcy and are integral to the bank-
ruptcy case). 
 296. See, e.g., In re Bujak, 2011 WL 5326038, at *3. 
 297. In re Extended Stay, Inc., 466 B.R. 188, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Custom 
Contractors, LLC, 462 B.R. at 907; Goldstein v. Eby-Brown, Inc. (In re Universal 
Mktg., Inc.), 459 B.R. 573, 576 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011) (finding that the fraudulent 
transfer claim was brought under 11 U.S.C. § 544 and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(H), not 
state law, and therefore is core because it comes from federal statutes); In re Heller 
Ehrman LLP, 2011 WL 4542512, at *4 (noting that fraudulent transfer actions are 
core and arise under sections 548 and 544(b) of the bankruptcy code along with sec-
tion 157(b)(2)(H) of the United States Code). 
 298. In re Custom Contractors, LLC, 462 B.R. at 905; In re Universal Mktg., Inc., 
459 B.R. at 578-80 (disagreeing with Blixseth and holding that the claim could still be 
heard by the bankruptcy court even if it is not core); In re Bujak, 2011 WL 5326038, 
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dealt with the confusion regarding fraudulent transfer claims was to suggest 
that the parties formally consent to the court’s adjudication of the claim, and 
if they would not consent, then they would be required to file briefs on the 
issue.299  In Pickard v. Estate of Madoff, a New York district court took a 
wait-and-see approach, stating that it was too early in the proceedings to de-
termine whether fraudulent transfer claim would be resolved as part of decid-
ing a creditor’s proof of claim.300 
While grappling with the Supreme Court’s precedent in this area, some 
lower courts have commented that while the Supreme Court intended Stern to 
be read narrowly, it is still plausible that someday the Supreme Court may 
expand Stern to reach fraudulent conveyances.301  Therefore, these bank-
ruptcy judges currently refuse to extend Stern to fraudulent conveyances. 
F.  Misrepresentation, Negligence, and Tortious Interference 
There is disagreement on whether misrepresentation claims can be con-
stitutionally adjudicated.  One court held that a counterclaim for misrepresen-
tation was necessarily determined in deciding the creditor’s claim, and there-
fore was core and a final judgment could be entered.302  However, a New 
York district court held that a misrepresentation claim was a state law claim 
that was a private right and could not be adjudicated by bankruptcy courts.303 
The majority of courts have held that negligence claims are state law 
claims that could not be constitutionally adjudicated by a non-Article III 
court.  However, a New York bankruptcy court held that a state court claim304 
  
at *4 (noting that the court would still have the power to hear the case and submit the 
findings to the district court to decide, even if the court was wrong about the claim 
being core); Meoli v. Huntingon Nat’l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 
318, 338 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (believing that a final judgment could be entered 
with consent if a fraudulent conveyance claim was found to be unconstitutionally 
core). 
 299. Rancher Energy Corp. v. Gas Rock Captial, LLC (In re Rancher Energy 
Corp.), No. 09-32943, 2011 WL 5320971, at *3 (Bankr. D. Colo. Nov. 2, 2011). 
 300. Picard v. Estate of Madoff, 464 B.R. 578, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 301. In re Bujak, 2011 WL 5326038, at *1-2; In re Custom Contractors, LLC, 462 
B.R. at 905-06; In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 715 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 2011). 
 302. Adams Nat’l Bank v. GB Herndon & Assocs., Inc. (In re GB Herndon & 
Assocs.), 459 B.R. 148, 165 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2011). 
 303. Coudert Bros. v. Baker & Makenzie LLP  (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), No. 11-
2785 CM, 2011 WL 5593147, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011); see also Meyers v. 
Textron Fin. Corp. (In re AIH Acquisitions, LLC), No. 09-42480-rfn7, 2011 WL 
4000894, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 7, 2011). 
 304. McCelland v. Grubb & Ellis Valuation & Advisory Grp. (In re McClelland), 
460 B.R. 397, 404 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).  The court rejected the plaintiff’s argu-
ment that the claim was a counterclaim, and therefore covered by Stern.  Id.  How-
ever, the court stated that even if the claim was seen as a counterclaim, it would not 
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could be core if it was sufficiently connected to the bankruptcy case.305  The 
court then held that claims of intentional misconduct and gross negligence 
were sufficiently connected to the bankruptcy case; thus, they were core 
claims and the court could enter final orders until trial.306 
Other courts have held that a negligence counterclaim is a state law 
claim that would require findings not necessary to resolving the underlying 
proof of claim, and therefore are non-core under Stern, even though they 
would be considered core under 28 U.S.C. section 157(b)(2)(C).307  One 
Texas bankruptcy court decided that a legal malpractice claim could not be 
constitutionally decided by the bankruptcy court under Stern without further 
discussion.308 
Tortious interference claims have not suffered much debate as they were 
the exact claim opined about in Stern.  Courts have held that Stern governs 
counterclaims for tortious interference meaning the claims cannot be constitu-
tionally decided by bankruptcy courts.309 Therefore, the claims are non-core 
even though they fit into the definition of core counterclaims under 28 U.S.C. 
section 157(b)(2)(C).310  Many courts have held that parties may consent to 
bankruptcy judges entering final judgments in tortious interference claims.311 
  
be covered by Stern’s ruling about counterclaims by the estate since it was a claim by 
the plaintiff suing in his individual capacity.  Id.  
 305. Id.  
 306. Id. at 404, 407; see also Picard v. Estate of Madoff, 464 B.R. 578, 585-87 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that a negligence claim could be constitutionally decided by 
a bankruptcy court if it was resolved with the proof of claim, but deciding it was too 
early to tell if it would be resolved by the proof of claim or not).  
 307. McKinstry v. Sergent (In re Black Diamond Mining Co.), No. 08-70066, 
2011 WL 4433624, at *6 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Sept. 21, 2011) (holding that the negli-
gence claim was probably not core under statute, but if it was then it was not constitu-
tionally core because it was a state law claim not necessarily resolved in ruling on the 
proof of claim); Sw. Sports Ctr., Inc. v. Kleem (In re Sw. Sports Ctr., Inc.), No. 09-
21982, 2011 WL 4002559, at *7 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Sept. 6, 2011); In re Olde Prairie 
Block Owner, LLC, 457 B.R. 692, 699 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 308. In re Mandel, No. 10-40219, 2011 WL 4599969, at *14 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 
Sept. 30, 2011). 
 309. Coudert Bros. v. Baker & Makenzie LLP  (In re Coudert Bros. LLP), No. 11-
2785 CM, 2011 WL 5593147, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2011) (holding that a tortious 
interference claim was found to be a private right in Stern and was unconstitutional 
for a bankruptcy court to finally adjudicate); In re Olde Prairie Block Owner, LLC, 
457 B.R. at 699. 
 310. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, No. 11 Civ. 
5337 CM, 2011 WL 6780600, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011) (holding that a tor-
tious interference claim was a private right that was not necessary to resolve in a 
proof of claim); Adams Nat’l Bank v. GB Herndon & Assocs., Inc. (In re GB Hern-
don & Assocs., Inc.), 459 B.R. 148, 155 (Bankr. D.D.C. 2011); In re Olde Prairie 
Block Owner, 457 B.R. at 699. 
 311. See, e.g., In re GB Herndon & Assocs., 459 B.R. at 162; In re Olde Prairie 
Block Owner, LLC, 457 B.R. at 699. 
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However, one court held that a tortious interference counterclaim would 
necessarily be resolved in adjudicating the creditor’s claim and therefore was 
core.312  The bankruptcy court held that it could enter a final judgment on the 
claim.313 
G.  Preferential Transfers 
Preferential transfers have also garnered some debate because of the 
claim’s history in Supreme Court of the United States cases.  Some courts 
have held that preferential transfers are core claims because they arise under 
title 11 and are classified as core by 28 U.S.C. section 157(b)(2)(F).314  Also, 
the court in In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy, L.P. documented in-
depth the history of Supreme Court cases dealing with preferential transfers 
and determined that preferential transfers are public rights and may be finally 
adjudicated by bankruptcy courts.315  Another court questioned the constitu-
tionality of finally adjudicating several other claims in an adversary proceed-
ing but did not question that the bankruptcy court could constitutionally enter 
a final order on the preference claim.316 
However, at least one court determined that while preferential transfers 
arise under bankruptcy law, they are private rights and thus cannot be finally 
adjudicated by a non-Article III court.317  Another bankruptcy judge treated 
preferential transfers as unconstitutionally core, even though the action had 
origins in bankruptcy code instead of state law, and merely recommended that 
the district court enter a judgment.318  This holding was born out of “an abun-
dance of caution” though, and the judge “le[ft] open the possibility . . . that 
  
 312. See In re GB Herndon & Assocs., 459 B.R. at 165. 
 313. Id.  
 314. In re Extended Stay, Inc., 466 B.R. 188, 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Samson v. 
Blixseth (In re Blixseth), No. 09-60452-7, 2011 WL 3274042, at *11 (Bankr. D. 
Mont. Aug. 1, 2011), order amended on denial of reconsideration by 463 B.R. 896 
(Bankr. D. Mont. 2012) (holding preferential transfers were core claims under the 
statute and constitution, and this holding was not affected by the later reconsidera-
tion). 
 315. In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy, LP, 465 B.R. 452, 468 (Bankr. S.D. 
Tex. 2011). 
 316. Rancher Energy Corp. v. Gas Rock Capital, LLC (In re Rancher Energy 
Corp.), No. 09-32943, 2011 WL 5320971, at *1-3 (Bankr. D. Colo. Nov. 2, 2011). 
 317. Tabor v. Kelly (In re Davis), No. 05-15794-GWE, 2011 WL 5429095, at *12 
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2011). 
 318. Richardson v. BDSM Corp. (In re Tevilo Indus., Inc.), No. 09-07311, 2011 
WL 4793343, at *2 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. Aug. 30, 2011), adopted sub nom. 
Richardson v. BDSM Corp., No. 1:11-CV-916, 2011 WL 4434894 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 
23, 2011). 
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[the judge] may have the authority . . . to enter final judgment[s]” in preferen-
tial transfers in the future.319 
H.  Unjust Enrichment 
Courts are fairly evenly split on whether unjust enrichment claims are 
constitutionally adjudicated by bankruptcy courts.  In some cases the plain-
tiffs have conceded that unjust enrichment is a core proceeding.320  In one 
case, the court acknowledged that it was possible that unjust enrichment is a 
core claim as it is necessary to resolve a proof of claim but did not decide 
because the parties had not briefed the issue.321  A bankruptcy court in the 
Tenth Circuit held that Stern did not apply to an unjust enrichment claim be-
cause it was not a state law counterclaim brought under 28 U.S.C. section 
157(b)(2)(C), and until the district court said otherwise, the bankruptcy court 
would read Stern very narrowly.322  Yet another court held outright that an 
unjust enrichment claim was defined by statute as core and was also constitu-
tionally core under Stern.323 
A New York district court disagreed that unjust enrichment claims were 
core and found that unjust enrichment claims dealt with private rights that 
would not be resolved in ruling on the proof of claim; therefore, while they 
may be defined as core by statute, they cannot be constitutionally resolved by 
a non-Article III court under Stern’s holding.324  In other cases, the courts 
avoided the constitutional issue altogether and found that unjust enrichment 
was a non-core claim covered by “related-to” jurisdiction, because if the trus-
tee prevails on the claim, money is brought into the estate and affects distri-
bution.325  
  
 319. Id. at 1-2.  
 320. See, e.g., Burtch v. Huston (In re USDigital, Inc.), 461 B.R. 276, 280 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2011). 
 321. Corwin v. Gorilla Cos. (In re Gorilla Cos.), No. CV-10-1029-PHX-DGC, 
2011 WL 4005403, at *2-3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 8, 2011). 
 322. Redmond v. Brad Noll & Assocs. (In re Brooke Corp.), No. 08-22786, 2011 
WL 6752422, at *1-2 (Bankr. D. Kan. Dec. 16, 2011). 
 323. Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco Inc.), 461 B.R. 181, 183-86 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 324. Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe, LLP, No. 11 Civ. 
5337 CM, 2011 WL 6780600, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 23, 2011). 
 325. Paloian v. Am. Express Co.  (In re Canopy Fin., Inc.), 464 B.R. 770, 774-75 
(N.D. Ill. 2011) (lumping an unjust enrichment claim in with fraudulent transfer 
claims that the court determined were statutorily core, but not constitutionally core, 
and therefore would be treated like non-core claims); Levey v. Hanson’s Window & 
Constr., Inc. (In re Republic Windows & Doors, LLC), 460 B.R. 511, 514-16 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 2011) (holding that bankruptcy judges could submit findings of fact and 
conclusions of law to district court judges for de novo review even if the proceeding is 
non-core and the parties do not consent); Bayonne Med. Ctr. v. Bayonne/Omini Dev., 
LLC (In re Bayonne Med. Ctr.), No. 07-15195 MS, 2011 WL 5900960 (Bankr. D. 
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One lucky court had an easy way out because both parties consented to 
entry of a final judgment on the unjust enrichment claim; therefore, the court 
held that it did not matter if the claim was core or non-core.326  A New York 
district court working on an estate bankruptcy also delayed a decision on 
whether unjust enrichment was constitutionally decided by the bankruptcy 
court and stated that it was too early in the proceedings to tell if the claim 
would be resolved with the proof of claim.327 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Bankruptcy, like history, seems doomed to repeat itself.  Like Marathon 
and Granfinanceria, bankruptcy litigants after Stern are awash with confusion 
over where to draw the constitutional line separating Article I and Article III 
courts.  Further, Stern failed to clarify questions that have been troubling 
bankruptcy law for almost two centuries: what exactly is the public rights 
exception, should we use the summary/plenary jurisdiction system, and how 
can Congress constitutionally empower the bankruptcy system?  
While Stern left many questions unanswered, the Supreme Court of the 
United States did shed some light on the next cycle of bankruptcy law.  First, 
we know that the Roberts Court is departing from the balancing test espoused 
in Schor and Union Carbide for determining whether bankruptcy courts are 
constitutional.  Instead of weighing risk of impartiality, cost savings, exper-
tise, and generally looking at “substance rather than doctrinaire reliance on 
formal categories,”328 the current Court sternly forbade further chipping away 
of Article III authority.  Further, we finally know once and for all – or for at 
least the next forty years – that Congress cannot escape constitutional prob-
lems with the bankruptcy system by calling bankruptcy courts “adjuncts” of 
the district courts.  Finally, we have some hint that the Stern Court may be 
hesitant to take some commentator’s advice and declare the entire system 
unconstitutional based on the purported narrowness of its holding.  
Moreover, lessons can be gleaned from the ways in which lower courts 
have dealt with claims post-Stern.  First, parties must be aware of the poten-
tial for problems post-Stern and examine claims made by the debtor in the 
suit, looking for claims listed in this Comment, among others.  If there is any 
question that a claim may not be constitutionally and finally decided by the 
bankruptcy court, parties should proceed with caution.  In the majority of 
courts it is clear that after Stern, a party may specifically consent to the final 
  
N.J. Nov. 1, 2011) (finding that an unjust enrichment claim was non-core because it 
did not arise under or in a title 11 case). 
 326. Pro-Pac Inc. v. Chapes (In re Pro–Pac, Inc.), 456 B.R. 894, 902-03 (Bankr. 
E.D. Wis. 2011), rev’d and remanded sub nom. WOW Logistics Co. v. Pro–Pac, Inc., 
11-CV-1075-JPS, 2012 WL 3495391 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 14, 2012). 
 327. Picard v. Estate of Madoff, 464 B.R. 578, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). 
 328. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586-87 (1985). 
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adjudication of a core claim that would otherwise be unconstitutionally de-
cided by a bankruptcy court.  The real question is: what will be seen as con-
sent by the bankruptcy court?  As discussed, courts have different methods of 
finding consent, ranging from failure to allege a problem with the court’s 
authority to requiring a knowing and express waiver.  
If there is a question as to whether a claim can be constitutionally de-
cided, for the majority of state law counterclaims, courts are taking a very 
fact specific approach.  In most courts the first issues that a litigant should 
address are: (1) does the action stem from the bankruptcy itself and (2) would 
the claim necessarily be resolved in the allowance process?329  If the claim is 
a fraudulent or preferential transfer claim, then a practitioner can argue that 
the claim stems from the bankruptcy itself based upon statutory language and 
the narrowness of Stern’s holding.  Additionally, both fraudulent and prefer-
ential transfers implicate an argument based on the public rights doctrine due 
to Granfinanciera.330  If the public rights doctrine is implicated, litigation will 
be risky because the history of the public rights doctrine is unclear, and bank-
ruptcy courts appear to define and apply the doctrine differently.   
On the other hand, if a litigant is dealing with a traditional state law 
counterclaim, then the litigant should turn to the second question: would the 
claim necessarily be resolved in the allowance process?  In order to determine 
whether the claim is necessarily resolved, the parties must look at the facts of 
their specific case.  First, they should consider the elements that the creditor 
will have to prove in order to succeed in its claim.  Then, they must examine 
the elements that the trustee or debtor will have to prove to succeed in its 
claim.  If there is substantial overlap then the counterclaim probably must be 
necessarily resolved.331    
Of course, given the diversity of bankruptcy court opinions, including a 
few that still think that Stern limited subject matter jurisdiction, caution is 
advised in navigating bankruptcy waters post-Stern.  However, while there 
may be rough waters ahead as individual bankruptcy courts deal with debtor 
claims against other parties for the first time post-Stern, district and appellate 
courts are already stepping in to give consistency to the court decisions.  Fur-
ther, the parties’ ability to consent to final judgments by the bankruptcy 
courts, and the ability of the bankruptcy court to still hear the matters and 
submit proposed findings of facts to the district court, is likely to result in 
little more than extra caution in consenting in pleadings and large amounts of 
“rubber stamping” by district courts.  Unless the Supreme Court disavows its 
  
 329. Burns v. Dennis (In re Se. Materials, Inc.), 467 B.R. 337, 348 (Bankr. 
M.D.N.C. 2012). 
 330. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 52-53 (1989). 
 331. For example, if a debtor’s response to a proof of claim for breach of contract 
is to allege that the party filing the claim breached the contract first, and thus the 
debtor was relieved of performance under the contract, it is necessary to determine 
who breached first to resolve the proof of claim. Cf. In re Mandel, No. 10-40219, 
2011 WL 4599969, at *17 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2011). 
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narrow holding in Stern, it is likely to be clear sailing ahead in bankruptcy, at 
least for the next forty years.   
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